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INTRODUCTION
Lawrence Peter "Yogi" Berra was born on May 12, 1925, in St. Louis,
Missouri,' and grew up to become one of baseball's all-time greats.2 Yogi
played nineteen years in the Major Leagues, eighteen with the New York
Yankees and one with the New York Mets He has been called the greatest
Yankee catcher ever.4 During his career, Yogi played in a record fourteen
World Series' and was elected the American League's Most Valuable Player
three times.6 Following his playing career, Yogi managed both the Yankees
and the New York Mets, and coached the Yankees, Mets, and Houston
THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 785-86 (Macmillan 10th ed. 1996).
- He was rated baseball's greatest catcher for an entire career and fourth best catcher during peak
seasons. See BILL JAMES, THE BILL JAMES HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 310-11 (1986). Yogi has also
been identified as one of the 50 best players ever, see PAUL ADOMITES & SAUL WISNIA, THE BEST OF
BASEBALL 17 (Publications Int'l. Ltd. 1996) [hereinafter THE BEST OF BASEBALL], and has been called
"[o]ne of the greatest catchers of all time-and one of the most amusing." DAVID H. MARTINEZ, THE BOOK
OF BASEBALL LITERACY 8 (1996).
' Yogi played from 1946-63 with the Yankees and in 1965 with the Mets. His regular season statis-
tics for those 19 years include a career batting average of .285, 358 home runs, 1175 runs scored, and 1430
runs batted in. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 785. See infra note 5 for Yogi's World Series
statistics.
See JAMES, supra note 2, at 310.
Yogi played in the World Series in 1947, 1949, 1950. 1951, 1952, 1953. 1955, 1956. 1957. 1958,
1960, 1961, 1962, and 1963. His overall World Series statistics include a batting average of .274, 12 home
runs, 41 runs scored, and 39 runs batted in. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note I, at 785-86. See infra
note 7 for information on Yogi's managing and coaching.
' Yogi won MVP awards in 1951, 1954, and 1955. See DAVID S. NEFT & RICHARD M. COHEN. THE
SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA: BASEBALL 695 (16th ed. 1996) [hereinafter SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Although
Yogi was the MVP in 1954, he once commented: "Bobby Avila had a good year... He got the MVP that
year, I think. 1954? I'm pretty sure. Didn't he?" DAVID H. NATHAN. BASEBALL QUOTATIONS 152 (1993)
[hereinafter BASEBALL QUOTATIONS].
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Astros.7 He received baseball's highest honor in 1972 when he was elected
into the Baseball Hall of Fame.8
However, Yogi's accomplishments go far beyond the baseball diamond.
He is renowned for his wit and wisdom.9 For example, Yogi's classic, "It's
not over 'til it's over,' 0l has been cited numerous times."
One commentator said of Yogi:
He never went beyond the eighth grade in school, yet he has a native
intelligence, an innate wisdom and a wonderfully simple way of cutting
through all the folderol and getting to the heart of a matter. When he
says something that seems funny, it really isn't funny at all, it is wise.
He expresses himself simply and naturally. 2
This Essay will examine Yogi's wisdom and demonstrate the parallels
between judges' and legislators' comments and what Yogi said; 3 only Yo-
gi said it better.
Yogi's wisdom relates to more than the law, and therefore exploration of
the connections by scholars in other fields is encouraged. To this end, two
Yogi managed the Yankees in 1964 and again in 1984 and 1985. See TOTAL BASEBALL: THE OF-
FICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 2332 (John Thom et al., eds., 4th ed. 1995) [hereinaf-
ter TOTAL BASEBALL]. He managed the Mets from 1972-75. Id. His record as a manager was 484 wins and
444 losses, a winning percentage of .522. Id. Yogi coached the Yankees in 1963 and again from 1976-83,
the Mets from 1965-71, and the Astros from 1986-89. Id. at 2355.
g BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA. supra note I, at 785. See also PHIL PEPE, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF
YOGI BERRA at xiii (2d ed. 1988) (noting that election into the Hall of Fame is "baseball's supreme hon-
or").
See generally PEPE, supra note 8 (writing on the The Wit and Wisdom of Yogi Berra).
Yogi gave this answer when asked about the Mets' chances for winning the 1973 National League
East pennant. BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150. See also PEPE, supra note 8, at 185 (quoting
Yogi Berra); PAUL DICKSON. BASEBALL'S GREATEST QUOTATIONS 43 (1991).
" A Westlaw search found fourteen law review articles, five state court cases, and eight federal court
cases which have cited this Berraism. Westlaw, Aug. 21, 1996.
PEPE, supra note 8. at xiii-xiv.
" The impact of baseball on the law has recently been the subject of heated scholarly debate. Com-
pare Charles Yablon, On the Conitribution of Baseball to American Legal Theoy. 104 YALE L.J. 227, 229
(1994) (extolling "the salutary influence of baseball rules and baseball traditions on the thought processes of
legal scholars") with Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphois in
Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 18 (1994) ("The fact that baseball metaphors have not been em-
ployed in any systematic fashion does not mean that they can do no harm.").
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guest scholars 4 will demonstrate how Yogi's insights relate both to med-
icine and physics. 5
THE LEGAL WISDOM OF YOGI BERRA
Yogi's sayings may be divided into sixteen categories, from Jurisprudence
to Physics, each category having subtopics. Many of Yogi's sayings touch
more than one category, showing the universality of Yogi's wisdom.
1. JURISPRUDENCE
Topic: Yogi on the Epistemological Foundations of the Judicial Process
Background:
Yogi Berra long has been regarded as one of this century's preeminent
philosophers. 6 His commentaries appear to be merely about baseball. But,
like a ballpark hot dog, there are many unexpected things to be discovered
beneath the surface of Yogi's observations. 7 Yogi's statements explore the
very nature of knowledge and truth. Imparting knowledge and revealing truth
to the trier of fact is, of course, a central goal of the judicial process. Hence,
Yogi's observations can be as useful in the courtroom as they are on the
diamond. Following are but a few illustrations.
Berraism8 A: " In baseball, you don't know nothing."' 9
" Paul Horowitz, Professor of Physics at Harvard University, and Kalman S. Eisenberg, M.D.. Assis-
tant Clinical Professor of Orthopedic Surgery at UCLA School of Medicine, are the guest scholars.
" See iMfa notes 478-93 and accompanying text.
See generally PEPE, supra note 8.
See. e.g.. Barghout v. Mayor, 600 A.2d 841 (Md. 1992) (prosecuting hot dog vendor for selling hot
dogs contaminated with nonkosher sausage grease as kosher).
" "Berraism" is a phrase used by former Yankee Jerry Coleman when discussing Yogi. see YOGI
BERRA wT TiM HORTON, YOGI 4 (1989), and also by Yogi himself. Id. at 16, 18. "Berraism" has also
been used by commentators. See. e.g., PEPE, supra note 8, at 185-88 (containing a glossary of Bermisms);
see also RICHARD LEDERER, ANGUISHED ENGLISH 89-91 (1987) (listing Berraisms).
" See DICKSON, supra note 10, at 43.
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Legal Significance:
Lack of bias on the part of the trier of fact is, of course, fundamental to a
fair trial.2 ' Here Yogi extends the same principle to baseball, observing that
preconceptions only get in the way of playing the game. Yogi teaches us that
preconceptions and biases are not only unfair, but they can also mislead.
There obviously is no such thing as a priori knowledge when you are squat-
ting behind a guy with a club in his hands. In this respect, a judge is like a
catcher, but without a mask.2 Some may interpret Yogi's statement as an
existentialist denial of objective reality and knowledge itself, an idea that may
have been borrowed from Nietzsche.22 It is also possible that Yogi simply
was talking to George Steinbrenner.2s
Berraism B: Why Yogi thought he would be a good manager: "You observe
a lot by watching."'24
See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) ("The constitutional standard of fairness requires
that a defendent have "a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.") (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961)).
' While it is difficult to find authority for the proposition that a judge is like a catcher, it is well
established that a judge is not an umpire. See United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090, 1093 (3d Cir. 1983)
(emphasizing that the Supreme Court has long abandoned the adverserial system that views judges as mere
umpires). Compare Harvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975). The only Judge in Major League history was Joe Judge, who was not a catcher. This Judge played
first base during 1915-34, mostly for the Washington Senators (1915-32), but also for the Brooklyn Dodgers
(1933) and Boston Red Sox (1933-34). BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 1204.
"" It is tempting to say that Freddy Nietzsche played center field for the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1913
and that Freddy is famous for being the only player to be ejected from a Major League game for arguing
that third base does not exist. However, the Dodgers' center fielder in 1913 was Casey Stengel, see TOTAL
BASEBALL, supra note 7, at 1303. later to become a Hall of Fame manager. Id. at 2349. We know that
Casey believed in the existence of third base because while managing the New York Mets in 1962, he said:
"When one of them guys hits a single to you, throw the ball to third. That way we can hold them to a dou-
ble." BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 282, 1629; BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 156.
While there was no Freddy Nietzsche in the Major Leagues, there was a Nietzsche who may not have be-
lieved in third base. This was Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, who is regarded as a forerunner of existential-
ism. This Nietzsche believed that the horrors of life, possibly referring to playing third base, could be
avoided by drawing an aesthetic veil over reality, then creating an ideal world. See T.Z. LAVINE, FROM
SOCRATES TO SARTRE: THE PHILOSOPHIC QUEST 324 (1984). See also FREDERICK COPELSTON S.J., A HIS-
TORY OF PHILOSOPHY 390, 397 (1994).
' George Steinbrenner is the principal owner of the New York Yankees. The 1996 AMERICAN
LEAGUE RED BOOK 31 (The Sporting News 6th ed. 1996).
.' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6; at 149; see also BERRA, supra note 18, at 7; DICKSON, supra
note 10, at 45; LEDERER, supra note 18, at 89; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
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Legal Significance:
Modem evidence law establishes that no lay witness may testify unless the
witness has personal knowledge." Here Yogi demonstrates the well-estab-
lished principle that personal knowledge must be based on perception.26
There are numerous other baseball axioms about perception that have legal
counterparts. For example, "keep your eye on the ball" conveys an idea com-
parable to the maxim "equity aids the vigilant."27 Similarly, the "hidden ball
trick" has its counterpart, the "Socratic method.
28
Berraism C: "How can I think and hit at the same time?"29
Legal Significance:
A corollary of the personal knowledge requirement is that lay witnesses
usually are precluded from expressing opinions and must restrict their testi-
mony to matters they have perceived." Yogi conclusively proves the wis-
dom of this rule. The witness, represented by Yogi's metaphor of the batter,
cannot reliably perceive and relate the facts if the witness tries at the same
time to form opinions about the meaning of those facts. It is the job of the
jury, not the witness, to draw conclusions about the meaning of the facts."
- FED. R. EVID. 602.
"' FED. R. EvID. 602 advisory committee's note.
., The entire maxim is "Equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights." DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993). Yogi batted on his lefts, although he threw on his rights. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA, supra note I, at 785.
2' When Socrates was over 70 years old, he was convicted of impiety and corrupting youth by the
Athenian Assembly and sentenced to die by drinking hemlock. The Socratic method has led generations of
law students to conclude that Socrates richly deserved what he got. ANTONY FLEW, A DICTIONARY OF PHI-
LOSOPHY 329 (2d ed. 1984).
'1 BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 149; see also ROSS PETRAS & KATHRYN PETRAS. THE
776 STUPIDEST THINGS EVER SAID 76 (1993).
3, The rule has medieval roots, possibly coinciding with invention of "the wave" during a rather te-
dious witch trial in the fourteenth century. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211 (1926);
PHIPSON, EVIDENCE 475 n.2 (10th ed. 1963) (quoting Anon. Lib. Ass'n 1349, at I 10, 11I).
"' See. e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 312 (West 1995).
[Vol. 46
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Topic: Maxims of Jurisprudence
Background:
The California Legislature, in its Civil Code, has pronounced various legal
maxims. 2 Yogi has made equivalent statements in words far more illuminat-
ing. For example:
Berraism: About the movie, The Magnificent Seven,33 starring Steve
McQueen: "He made that picture before he died."34
or
Explaining his variety of sweaters in assorted colors: "The only
color I don't have is navy brown. 35
Equivalent California Civil Code (§ 1597): "Everything is deemed possible
except that which is impossible in the nature of things."36
Berraism: On the Mets' chances in the 1973 National League East pennant
race: "It's not over 'til it's over.,
37
Equivalent California Civil Code (§ 3547): "A thing continues to exist as
long as is usual with things of that nature."38
32 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1597, 3509-48 (West 1996).
" United Artists 1960.
BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 149; BERRA, supra note 18, at 6; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 42; PEPE, supra note 8, at 186.
31 PEPE, supra note 8, at 186; see also LEDERER, supra note 18, at 134.
'6 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1597 (West 1996). Section 1597 was also cited in another article on the cutting
edge of legal scholarship. See Paul Horowitz et al., The Law of Prime Numbers, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 185,
199 n.ii (1993) (quoting CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1597).
" See supra note 10.
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 3547 (West 1996).
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Berraism: On why he thought he would be a good manager: "You observe
a lot by watching."39
Equivalent California Civil Code (§ 3527): "The law helps the vigilant."4
Berraism: On his theory of baseball, the thinking person's game: "Baseball
is ninety percent mental and the other half is physical.'
or
When asked by a waitress whether he wanted his pizza cut into
four or eight pieces: "Better make it four. I don't think I can eat
eight."
42
or
"You give 100% in the first half of the game, and if that isn't
enough in the second half you give what's left. 4
3
Equivalent California Civil Code (§ 3536): "The greater contains the less."'
Berraism: On the shadows in left field at Yankee Stadium in the fall: "It
gets late early out there.
4
Equivalent California Civil Code (§ 3546): "Things happen according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 46
° See supra note 24.
41 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3527 (West 1996).
4' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 149; BERRA, supra note 18, at 7; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 41; LEDERER, supra note 18, at 91; see also PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
'2 LEE GREEN, SPORTSWIT 157 (1984). See also DICKSON, supra note 10, at 45; LEDERER, supra note
18, at 91.
DICKSON, supra note 10, at 45. See also BERRA, supra note 18, at 6: PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note
29, at 76.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3536 (West 1996).
' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; BERRA, supra note 18, at 11: DICKSON, supra note
10. at 43; LEDERER, supra note 18, at 91; PEPE. supra note 8, at 187.
41 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3546 (West 1996).
[Vol. 46
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Berraism: Explaining his variety of sweaters in assorted colors: "The only
color I don't have is navy brown. 47
Equivalent California Civil Code (§ 3530): "That which does not appear to
exist is to be regarded as if it did not exist."
48
Berraism: When asked by a player for the correct time: "Do you mean
now?
,4 9
Equivalent California Civil Code (§ 3535): "Contemporaneous exposition is
in general the best."5
Topic: Finality of Judgments
Berraism: On the Mets' chances in the 1973 National League East pennant
race: "It's not over 'til it's over."5'
Legal Significance:
Much of the stability and certainty of our legal system rely upon the es-
sence of this Berraism and are in fact contained in the Constitution of the
United States. Where would our entire system of jurisprudence be without the
concept of appellate review? Indeed, if "it was over when it was over" at the
trial or legislative level, much of the work of the Supreme Court would cease
to exist, 2 and then so much for our system of checks and balances.
, See supra note 35.
4: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3530 (West 1996).
4' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 152; BERRA, supra note 18, at 9; PEPE, supra note 8, at
187.
." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3535 (West 1996).
• See supra note 10.
'- The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is found in Article Il, section 2 of the United
States Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. Ill, § 2. The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is limited to cases
involving Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and some cases involving States. Id. Also, it is
the Supreme Court which ultimately decides if acts of Congress have exceeded the bounds permitted under
the Constitution. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626-30 (1995).
1997]
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In addition to our appellate system, there are other areas where this
Berraism applies. For example, the notions of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel 3 are predicated upon an understanding of when "over" is. Similarly,
in the arena of criminal law, by Constitutional decree, there is a guarantee
against double jeopardy,'4 so that a defendant in a criminal matter can know
with certainty that "it is over when it's over." However, in some cases, while
it might be over from a criminal standpoint, it may not be over from a civil
one, and it may never be over in the courtroom of public opinion."5
2. COURTS
Topic: U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Berraism: "How can I think and hit at the same time?" 56
Background:
From The New York Times, Your Law-Baseball Quiz"
The names of four major league baseball personalities appear after the
name of a Supreme Court Justice. Circle the name of the baseball fig-
ure who bears the same relationship to baseball as the Justice bears to
law.
Question: Earl Warren
(a) Yogi Berra
(b) Roberto Clemente
(c) Tris Speaker
(d) Willie Mays
Answer. (a) Yogi Berra
" The concepts involved in res judicata and collateral estoppel are discussed in Parklane Hosie.,
Company v Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-33 nn. 4-5 (1979).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" See. e.g.. FRANK SCHMALLEGER, PH.D., TRIAL OF THE CENTURY: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA VS. ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON (1996).
" See supra note 29.
Robert M. Cover, Your Law-Baseball Quiz. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1979. reprinted il SPENCER WE-
BER WALLER ET AL., BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 431-33 (1995).
[Vol. 46
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Both Warren and Berra were enormously effective performers on teams
with many stars. Despite the presence of players such as Mantle, Maris,
Frankfurter, Douglas and Black in the same lineup---all of whom ap-
peared to have a more elegant swing or style, Berra and Warren were
the truly most valuable players. Both would frequently swing at bad
pitches, but both were capable of hitting them for extra bases, especially
in the clutch. Both saw through excessive thought to the true essence of
their game.
Theorists beset us with other definitions of law .... But the idea of
justice survives all such myopic views, for as Cicero said, "We are born
to it," said Warren. 5R
Or as Yogi said more succinctly, "How can [you] think and hit at the same
time?"
Topic: Res Judicata; Institutional Role of the Supreme Court
Berraism: On the Mets' chances in the 1973 National League East pennant
race: "It's not over 'til it's over."59
Legal Application:
Two central features of our law were neatly captured in this phrase, one
directly and the other indirectly.
Directly, Yogi expressed the basic principle of res judicata. Compare the
subtlety of the recognition that when it's over, it's over, with the more
ponderous expressions of the Supreme Court: "[T]he res judicata renders
white that which is black, and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo
rectum, ex albo nigrum."'
Indirectly, he captured the institutional role of the Supreme Court. Once the
Supreme Court has spoken, it is over. Here he has a closer rival-if not the
whole Court, at least Justice Jackson: "We are not final because we are infal-
lible, but we are infallible only because we are final."6'
" Id. at 431-33.
' See supra note 10.
Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (I How.) 352, 364 (1859).
" Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443. 540 (1953) (Jackson. J., concurring).
1997]
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Topic: Abstention
Berraism: Yogi to a radio broadcaster before an interview: "If you ask me
anything I don't know, I'm not going to answer."
62
Legal Application:
The United States Supreme Court put Yogi's idea into effect in Gilligan v.
Morgan.63 Plaintiffs filed the case on behalf of all students at Kent State
University in Ohio.' The essence of the complaint was that during a period
of civil unrest on the campus, the National Guard, having been called by the
Governor of Ohio to preserve civil order, violated students' rights of speech
and assembly and caused injury and death to students.65
Plaintiffs sought, among other things, a judicial evaluation of the "training,
weaponry and orders" of the Ohio National Guard and also asked the courts
to "establish standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind
of orders to control the actions of the National Guard."
'
The Court declined to regulate the National Guard, partly because:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a
military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject
always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.617
'_ PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 151.
63 413 U.S. I (1973).
Id. at 3.
' Id.
I d. at 5-6.
SId at 10. The Court also noted that responsibility for decisions involving regulation of the military
are appropriately vested in branches of government which are subject to electoral accountability. Id.
[Vol. 46
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Legal Significance:
Just as Yogi would not answer a sportscaster's question if Yogi did not
know the answer, the Court refused to answer the question of how the mili-
tary should be regulated, partly because the Court did not know the answer to
the question.
Topic: Precedent
Berraism: Disputing the veracity of many of the Berraisms: "I really didn't
say everything I said."6
Legal Application:
The United States and California Supreme Courts agree. In 1972, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment absolutely pre-
cludes any regulation of expressive activity predicated in whole or in part on
the content of the communication. 9 Just four years later plaintiffs relied on
this declaration in challenging a law that regulated adult movie theaters based
on content.7" The Supreme Court upheld the law.71 In explaining this seem-
ing contradiction, the Court declared: "But we learned long ago that broad
statements of principle, no matter how correct in the context in which they
are made, are sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute
limit of the stated principle is reached. ' 72
The California Supreme Court has proven similarly deft with words, ex-
plaining that the California Legislature really did not say everything it said.
In Mass v. Board of Education,73 the court ordered a teacher reinstated.
Then-current section 13516.5 of the California Education Code75 declared
BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 151; see also PEPE, supra note 8, at 188.
" See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
" See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
' Id. at 72-73.
72 Id. at 65.
' 394 P.2d 579 (Cal. 1964).
71 Id. at 591.
" CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13516.5 (renumbered as § 87811 (repealed West 1981) and § 45037 (repealed
West 1994)).
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that past salary may be paid to a teacher reinstated by a court order.76 The
Board of Education argued it should not be required to give the teacher back
pay. The California Supreme Court rejected the Board's argument, ex-
plaining:
Finally, the board contends that although section 13516.5 permits it to
compensate petitioner, the statute does not require it to do so. Although
the word "may" customarily implies permissiveness .... words must be
construed in their textual context. The word "may" here occurs in a
statute defining a public duty. "Words permissive in form, when a public
duty is involved, are considered as mandatory."7
Legal Significance:
When commenting on what previously had been said, Yogi and the U.S.
and California Supreme Courts made the same point, except Yogi said it
shorter and better.
Topic: Precedent
Berraism: "I really didn't say everything I said."79
Legal Application:
This refrain can often be heard by court of appeal judges in California.
Published opinions of the court of appeal first appear in the advance sheets of
the California Appellate Reports." However, appearance of an opinion in
the official advance sheets does not constitute "official" publication. They
may miraculously "disappear" even though they are still in print.
7 Mass, 394 P.2d at 585.
7 Id.
" Id. at 586.
See supra note 68.
" Not all opinions of the court of appeal are published. Publication occurs only if a majority of the
court rendering the opinion certifies that it meets certain standards, such as establishing a new rule of law,
resolving an apparent conflict in the law, involving a legal issue of continuing public interest, or making a
significant contribution to legal literature. See. e.g.. CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 976(b).
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There are several ways that opinions appearing in the official advance
sheets become nullities and cannot be cited. First, if the California Supreme
Court grants a review or rehearing of the case, the court of appeal opinion
published in the official advance sheets is considered to be superseded and
without precedential value." Also, an opinion can simply be decertified (or
depublished) by an order of the California Supreme Court even if the su-
preme court declines to accept the case on review or to grant a rehearing. 2
Of course, this creates quite a problem for researchers in California, who
must determine the current status of a court of appeal decision.
Therefore, a court of appeal judge may think she is saying something when
she writes an opinion. The opinion may even be certified for publication and
make its way into the official advance sheets. However, if the California
Supreme Court grants a hearing or orders depublication of the opinion, the
opinion ceases to exist for precedential value,83 even though it still can be
found in the official advance sheets.
Legal Significance:
Because such opinions are not citable and have no precedential effect, the
judge really did not say what she thought she said.
Topic: Stdre Decisis
Berraism: "It's not over 'til it's over." 84
Legal Application #1:
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter appointed Judge Robert M. Parker to the
federal bench in the Eastern District of Texas, where he soon discovered that
almost his entire docket-and his life's work-consisted of asbestos litiga-
tion. In 1980, seeking to streamline the litigation of thousands of repetitive
claims, Judge Parker invoked the doctrine of stare decisis to grant Widow
" See CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 976(d).
'" See CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 979.
" See CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 977.
' See supra note 10.
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Migues's partial summary judgment motion to eliminate the issue whether
asbestos products cause lung cancer."5 On the defendant Fibreboard's out-
raged appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendant, judicially recogniz-
ing the concept, "It's not over til it's over.
'86
Legal Application #2:
In its order granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, the
district court construed Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products7 as establishing
"as a matter of law" that asbestos products cause lung cancer, and that such
products are unreasonably dangerous to consumers or other users under Texas
standards of strict product liability.8 This "holding of law" was found to
control all product liability actions involving asbestos through the operation
of stare decisis principles. 9 Accordingly, the district court held that insofar
as the unreasonably dangerous nature of asbestos already had been established
as a matter of law, that issue need not be tried to the jury in the case." The
Fifth Circuit found that the district court's interpretation of Borel was erro-
neous.' The district court may have thought that Borel stood for the
proposition that all asbestos products are unreasonably dangerous as a matter
of law, but upon reviewing Borel, the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was
"no such decisis in Borel to stare."'9
Topic: Ripeness
Berraism: "When you come to the fork in the road, take it."93
Meaning: As with so many of Yogi's sayings, there is more than one level
of meaning. The obvious meaning of "when you come to a fork
in the road, take it" puts the emphasis on "take it," meaning when
forced with a choice, make it. A more subtle meaning places the
See Migues v. Nicolet Indus., 493 F. Supp. 61. 64 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1981).
'7 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
Migues, 662 F.2d at 1187.
xq Id.
w Id.
q1 Id.
'- Id.
" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150: BERRA, supra note 18, at 7.
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emphasis on "when," meaning do not make premature decisions.
This subtle meaning has legal significance.
Legal Application:
The United States Supreme Court focused on "when" in Barry Goldwater
v. Carter.94 In this case, various members of Congress filed suit alleging that
President Carter had violated his sworn duty to uphold the laws of the United
States by terminating a treaty with Taiwan." The suit sought declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent termination of the treaty, asserting that only Con-
gress, not the President, may terminate treaties.96 The Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari, and ordered the complaint dismissed.97 Justice Powell filed a
statement which summarized the posture of the case. He said "a few Mem-
bers of Congress claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty
with Taiwan has deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a
change in the supreme law of the land. Congress has taken no official action.
In the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there ever will
be an actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive Branch-
es. 98
Justice Powell further elaborated:
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not
ripe for judicial review. Prudential considerations persuade me that a
dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial
review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its consti-
tutional authority. Differences between the President and the Congress
are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost
invariably do, turn on political rather than legal considerations. The Judi-
cial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a
constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or
even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of is-
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
9, These facts come from the lower court opinion. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701 (1979),
vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
Id.
* Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
I. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
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sues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve
the conflict."
Legal Significance:
Thus, Justice Powell agreed with Yogi: take the fork in the road when it is
reached, not before.
Topic: Law of the Case
Berraism: "It's dejA vu all over again."'"
Legal Application:
Under the doctrine of the law of the case, a determination made at an earli-
er stage of a proceeding will be treated as correct in all subsequent stages of
the proceeding before the same tribunal.'0 ' A trial court will treat its earlier
rulings as conclusive in later trial proceedings, and an appellate court will
likewise treat its earlier decision on a legal issue as conclusive on a subse-
quent appeal in the same case."02 Application of the law'of the case is a
matter of judicial practice rather than a limit on the power of courts.' The
doctrine conserves judicial resources by eliminating repetitive hearings,
provides consistency in successive stages of an action, and promotes public
confidence in the judicial system by adherence to decisions already made." 4
Although serving institutional administration of justice interests, the doc-
trine sometimes operates at the expense of the merits of an individual case.
Thus, in Lincoln National Life Insurance Company v. Roosth,os the Fifth
Id. at 997 (citation omitted).
DICKSON, supra note 10, at 44. Although this saying is widely attributed to Bera, see. e.g., United
States v. Manni, 810 F.2d 80. 81 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Yogi Berra as saying "djA vu all over again");
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 754 F. Supp. 1576, 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (relating that Yogi Berra
once said, "it's like ddjh vu all over again"), Yogi denies he said it. BERRA, supra note 18, at 15. On the
other hand, Yogi did say, "I really didn't say everything I said," see supra note 68, so go figure.
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 535-36 (2d ed. 1977).
I02 d.
See Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912).
' See Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 1.
I' 306 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1962) (en banc).
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Circuit applied the law of the case on a successive appeal, even though both
the second panel of the court and the full court (to which the case was or-
dered resubmitted prior to decision of the second panel) disagreed with the
decision of the first panel."t
The court was concerned about encouraging multiple appeals in order to
find a receptive panel" 7 and about procedural variations resulting in the
availability of successive appeals in some instances but not in others.' Per-
haps with Yogi's jurisprudential wisdom in mind, the court employed a
baseball analogy to express its concern:
One of the vices is that whether a litigant gets a second, or a third time
at bat likewise depends so much on chance, or at least on factors mak-
ing it most unfair that in one situation a second trial and appeal is avail-
able while in another one it is lacking."°
Accordingly, the court concluded:
[N]othing about this case warrants our exercising the undoubted power
to overrule the prior decision reached by the Court on the first appeal.
On the contrary, any effort to re-examine the merits and now declare a
result-either the same or a different one-independent of the former
decision leads to consequences much more serious to the permanent,
objective, administration ofjustice under law than any supposed individ-
ualized injustice to one or all of the litigants."0
Legal Significance:
When the doctrine of the law of the case is applied, "[i]t's d6ja vu all over
again"-for the court as well as the parties.
' Id. at 112. The disagreement was not on the controlling standard, whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to make a jury case (a question of law), but only on whether the evidence satisfied that standard. Id.
'7 Id. at 114.
lr Id.
"' Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Topic: Federal War Powers
Berraism: On the Mets' chances in the 1973 National League East pennant
race: "It's not over 'til it's over."'''
Legal Application:
Under the war powers conferred on the federal government by the Consti-
tution," 2 Congress and the President may be able to act in areas that nor-
mally are reserved to the states. Local matters that fall within the scope of
the states' police power and which Congress could not reach even under a
broad reading of its power to regulate interstate commerce"3 may become
subject to federal regulation through the war powers.
On various occasions, the federal government has sought to enact and/or
enforce war powers legislation after the war has ended.' When these mea-
sures were challenged in court, the question arose as to when a war is over
for purposes of the government's ability to exercise its war powers. The
Supreme Court's consistent answer has been: "it's not over 'til it's over."
Thus, in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co."' and Ruppert v.
Caffey,"6 the Court upheld the government's authority to adopt and enforce
"war-time prohibition" after the World War I armistice."7 In Hamilton, the
Court explained that the war powers still could be invoked because "the trea-
ty of peace has not yet been concluded,. . . other war activities have not
been brought to a close, and ... it ... can not even be said that the man-
power of the nation has been restored to a peace footing . . .
. See supra note 10.
"2 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. cls. I, 11-16; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cl. I.
. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 3.
"1 See CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS
SINCE 1918 (1989).
"' 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
"' 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
" Hamilton. 251 U.S. at 163.
,1x Id.
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Similarly in the wake of World War II, the Court sustained a federal rent
control law that was adopted under authority of the war powers two years
after the war had ended.' According to the Court, "the war power includes
the power 'to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress'
and continues for the duration of that emergency."'
20
Legal Significance:
In war as in baseball, "it's not over 'til it's over."
Topic: Libel/First Amendment
Berraism: Disputing the veracity of many of the Berraisms: "I really didn't
say everything I said."' 2'
Legal Application:
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,'12 - the Supreme Court held that the
intentional fabrication of quotations in an article was not enough, by itself, to
establish liability for libel if the statements were substantially accurate in
reflecting what was said." Masson concerned a libel suit brought by
Jeffrey Masson, a psychoanalyst, against Janet Malcolm, a writer for The New
Yorker.'14 The article was based on more than 40 hours of interviews and
contained many quotations; however, none of the quotes were actual state-
ments made during the interviews.'
25
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, said that quotation marks do
not convey that what is within them is a word-for-word transcription of an
actual statement. Rather, the Court said that a quotation implies a substan-
tially accurate representation of a person's statement. The issue, therefore, is
not whether the quotation published is a verbatim reflection of what was said,
"* See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
Id. at 141.
See supra note 68.
s501 U.S. 496 (1991).
' Id. at 517.
'"' Id. at 499-502.
,. Id. at 502.
1997]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
but whether it is substantially accurate. Falsely attributing a statement to a
person can be the basis for defamation liability, but there has to be proof that
the statements substantially change the meaning of what was said.
2 6
Legal Significance:
Like Yogi claiming false attribution, Jeffrey Masson did not say everything
that Janet Malcolm attributed to him. But the Supreme Court says it does not
matter so long as the quotation reflects the "spirit" of what was said.
Topic: Obscenity/First Amendment
Berraism: When asked about the 1984 Yankees' dismal record: "I wish I
had an answer to that because I'm getting tired of answering that
question." '
Legal Application:
The United States Supreme Court has had difficulty in defining "obsceni-
ty." In fact, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 8 a case dealing with prosecution for ex-
hibition of an obscene film,'29 Justice Stewart, concurring in the reversal of
the conviction, said the Court may be trying to define the undefinable.' °
Later in Miller v. California,' the Court listed what must be proven to
obtain a conviction for an offense involving "obscene" material. The basic
guidelines for the trier of fact are:
(a) [W]hether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to pruri-
ent interests; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual contact specifically defined by the applicable state
':' Id. at 499, 517-18.
', DICKSON, supra note 10. at 42; PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 76.
378 U.S. 184 (1964).
I ld. at 185-86.
", Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"3 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.' a2
One year later, concurring in Jenkins v. Georgia33 that the movie Carnal
Knowledge was not obscene, Justice Brennan said the obscenity standard still
was vague. He wrote:
[I]t is clear that as long as the Miller test remains in effect "one cannot
say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of
this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it
so."'
l 4
Legal Significance:
Yogi's wish that people would stop asking him a question to which he has
no answer seemingly is the same wish as that of some of the Justices in ob-
scenity cases. Because the Court, according to Justice Brennan, is unable to
say what "obscenity" means, many members of the Court, no doubt, wish liti-
gants would stop asking.
Topic: Equal Protection/Gender Discrimination
Berraism: When a Yankee player walked into the hotel bar and said he was
waiting for Bo Derek 35 to meet him, Yogi responded: "I ha-
ven't seen him."'' 36
Legal Application:
In Geduldig v. Aiello, 37 the Supreme Court ruled that discrimination
based on pregnancy was not gender-based discrimination. Specifically, the
"r Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
"' 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
' Id. at 164-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92
(1973)).
"' Actress Bo Derek starred, with actor Dudley Moore, in the 1979 movie 10. Helen Sierra, The
Check's in the Mail, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1992, available in 1992 WL 4470958: Bruce Westerbrook, Moore
Has Made Some Forgettable Films, Hous. CHRON., Apr. II, 1993, available in 1993 WL 9546939.
"' BERRA, supra note 18, at 15; PEPE, supra note 8, at 152.
"' 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
1997]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court held that it was not a denial of equal protection for a state's
disability insurance system to exclude pregnancy-related disabilities, but in-
clude disabilities affecting only men. California's disability law provided
payments for disabilities lasting more than eight days and less than twenty-six
weeks, but denied any coverage for disabilities caused by pregnancy.3
In a footnote, the Court elaborated: "The lack of identity between the ex-
cluded disability and gender as such under this insurance program becomes
clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients
into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes."'39
Legal Significance:
The Supreme Court amazingly held that discrimination based on pregnancy
is not gender discrimination. The entire burden from the exclusion of preg-
nancy is borne by women, making the discriminatory nature of the exclusion
obvious. Like Yogi, the Court failed to recognize basic gender differences.
Congress, by statute, effectively overruled Geduldig when it enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which defines sex discrimination to include
pregnancy discrimination 4 ' and prohibits discrimination on that basis.'4'
Topic: Equal Protection/Economic Regulation
Berraism: When Yogi's son Dale Berra was playing shortstop for the Pitts-
burgh Pirates, the younger Berra was asked to compare himself to
his father. Dale responded: "Our similarities are different."'4
" Id. at 487-88, 494-95. 496 n.20.
I ld. at 496 n.20.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
'4. BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 153; LEDERER. supra note 18, at 135. This Dale Berraism
qualifies for inclusion in this Essay under the compelling doctrines of "like father, like son" and "the apple
doesn't fall far from the tree." GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, DICTIONARY OF POPULAR PROVERBS 15, 218
(1996).
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Legal Application:
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized that what may ap-
pear to be similar may in fact be different. For example, in City of New Or-
leans v. Dukes,4' the city passed an ordinance prohibiting vendors from
selling food from pushcarts in the French Quarter. The ordinance, however,
permitted vendors who had operated continuously in that area for eight or
more years to continue operating.'" Nancy Dukes, who had operated a
pushcart business in the French Quarter for only two years, challenged the
ordinance on equal protection grounds.4
The Court said that the city had decided "to preserve the appearance and
custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive to tourists."'146 The
Court reasoned that this objective could be met by banning peddlers and
hawkers who interfered with its charm and beauty and disturbed tourists,
thereby causing a deleterious effect on the city's economy. 47 The Court
also found that the two vendors who qualified under the "grandfather clause"
had themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm that distin-
guish the French Quarter. The Court concluded that the city's judgments
were rational, and did not constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of
equal protection. 4
8
Legal Significance:
Yogi's son Dale Berra recognized that what might appear on the surface to
be similar really has differences, an observation shared by the Court when it
recognized that all pushcart vendors were not the same.
* *,1 *
' 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
I (. at 298.
" i. at 298-99.
' Id. at 304 (quoting Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1974)).
' Id. at 304-05.
l i. at 305.
1997]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Topic: Separation of Powers
Berraism: Once while playing the game Twenty Questions, Yogi asked: "Is
he living?" Then without thinking, asked, "Is he living now?"
149
Legal Application:
This comment reflects a sensitive understanding of the Supreme Court's
separation of powers jurisprudence. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,50 the
Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that purported to
allow reinstatement of any securities fraud lawsuit that had been dismissed
based on a particular statute of limitations determination the Court had made
during the pendency of the suit. The Court held the statute unconstitutional,
as an attempt to resurrect suits that were "dead." On the other hand, the
Court acknowledged that Congress could change the law governing a lawsuit
and make the new rule retroactive to all suits that were still "living" on ap-
peal."' Thus, the Court found the key constitutional distinction to lie in
whether the lawsuit was "living now," i.e., at the time the new rule became
law.
Topic: Civil Rights
Berraism: One day the great catcher and coach was told about the visit to
the United States of Robert Briscoe, the first Jewish mayor of
Dublin. Yogi commented: "It could only happen in America."'
52
Legal Application:
In his comment, Yogi expressed a belief, widely held among Americans,
that the nation is exceptional in many ways,'53 and especially so with regard
" BERRA, supra note 18, at 17.
v 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
' M. at 1457.
" DICKSON. supra note 10. at 43.
". Historians and sociologists talk about "American exceptionalism" to refer to a variety or beliefs and
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to individual rights. But the humorous side of Yogi's "only in America"
comment also deserves note, as it reflects a significant shortcoming in the
nation's commitment to civil rights.
Yogi is right that the idea of ensuring equal opportunity, regardless of
status, is dear to American hearts, including those beating in legal chests. The
nation was founded on the premise that "all men are created equal."'54
Courts have often regarded the protection of civil rights as central to national
values and identity. Thus a nineteenth-century jurist struck down a San Fran-
cisco ordinance aimed at Chinese residents as not only a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but "unworthy of a brave and manly people."'55 In
this century, Justice Frankfurter linked America's commitment to civil rights
to a larger Western tradition, holding that fundamental due process depends
on "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice
of English-speaking peoples."'5 6 And throughout our history, legal advo-
cates have used the epithet "un-American" to attack proposals that may in-
fringe civil rights.'57
practices which distinguish, and appear to distinguish, the United States from the rest of the world. See. e.g.,
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996); DAVID M.
WROBEL, THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: FRONTIER ANXIETY FROM THE OLD WEST TO THE NEW
DEAL (1993); Is AMERICA DIFFERENT? A NEW LOOK AT AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (Byron E. Shafer ed.,
1991).
"I THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE par. I (U.S. 1776). These words have certainly grown in
meaning since that day. See GARRY VILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE
AMERICA 121-47 (1992).
"' Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. 252, 256-57 (Cir. Cal. 1879) (striking down so-called "queue ordi-
nance" in San Francisco which required that all jail inmates have their hair cut to a length of one inch, an
ordinance aimed at Chinese men who wore their hair in a traditional queue).
"' Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (establishing a constitutional right to substantive
due process). See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) ("The knock at the door, whether by day
or night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not
need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.") Nevertheless,
the Court in Wolfheld that evidence obtained in such an unauthorized search need not be excluded from a
criminal trial. Id. at 33.
"' See. e.g., State v. Williams, 674 A.2d 1372, 1382 (Conn. App. 1996) (Foti, J., dissenting) (quoting
defense attorney's jury argument on insufficient evidence presented by prosecution: "[A]s good citizens like
I know you are, you could never convict a man on such a shabby case.... You couldn't do that as a good
person or as a good citizen. You know, it sounds corny, but, it would be un-American."); Meyers v. Town
of Westport, 570 A.2d 249, 252 (Conn. Supp. 1989) (quoting argument that ban on certain municipal em-
ployees running for office was un-American); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 372 n.46 (E.D.
La. 1963) (quoting nineteenth-century attacks on Louisiana constitutional proposal to place numerous restric-
tions on the right to vote; one state constitutional delegate considered it an "un-American doctrine that a
man shall be a voter because his father or grandfather once possessed that right"; another called the proposal
"glaringly unconstitutional, undemocratic and un-American.") affrd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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Alas, Yogi's comment also illustrates that American pride in civil rights is
often both parochial and exaggerated. Ours is hardly the only nation in the
world in which a Jew could become mayor after all. Worse, denials of in-
dividual freedoms have a long legal tradition in America. The United States
was founded in part on slavery; 158 its highest court permitted a system of
racial segregation to flourish for nearly a century following emancipation;'59
and during this century the law did little to curb the civil liberties oppressions
of the ironically named Committee on Un-American Activities, 16° to cite but
a few of the more prominent examples of legal lapses in American civil
rights.
Legal Significance:
In his quip Yogi identified America with civil rights, and indeed such
rights remain the glory of the nation's legal system, but Yogi's comment also
revealed the unfortunate gap between American ideal and reality.
Topic: Civil Rights
Berraism: Explaining declining attendance in Kansas City: "If people don't
want to come to the ballpark, nobody's going to stop them."' ' 61
"' U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 9; art. IV, § 2. See DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 1765-1820 (1982).
"' See. e.g.. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
Racial segregation of course extended to major league baseball until after World War II. It is difficult to say
exactly when major league baseball began. However, it might be said that the modem era began in 1903
when the winners of the American and National Leagues first met in the World Series. Boston (American
League) beat Pittsburgh (National League) five games to three. It was not until 1947 that the first African-
American, Jackie Robinson, played in the major leagues. Robinson played for the Brooklyn Dodgers, win-
ning National League Rookie of the Year honors in 1947. He was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in
1962. SPORTs ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6. at 20, 270, 662.
"' See. e.g.. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959). Seegenerall' DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR (1978); GRIFFIN FARIELLO. RED SCARE: MEMORIES
OF THE AMERICAN INQUISITION (1995); STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION (1982).
' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6. at 150; DICKSON, supra note 10. at 43; LEDERER. supra note
18. at 134. PEPE. supra note 8, at 185.
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Legal Application:
In United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment and Housing Authori-
ty,6 the city of Charlottesville, Virginia, was challenged by the federal
government because of the city's method of assigning tenants to public hous-
ing. Charlottesville attempted to integrate the housing with a "50/50 mix of
black and white residents."'63 However, as a result of this policy, black ap-
plicants had to wait considerably longer than white applicants for spaces. The
court found that, although Charlottesville was to be commended for at-
tempting to integrate housing, the plan used by the city resulted in unjustified
discrimination against blacks. The city had argued that the white community
had great needs for public housing. The court, however, found that the ab-
sence of whites on the waiting list demonstrated that whites did not perceive
this need. The court stated:
Even if, in abstract terms, this need for public housing among the white
population of Charlottesville is real, CRHA has yet to demonstrate how
its plans will convince the white community of its own public housing
needs and then, short of some sort of coercive feature, induce them to
act upon those needs. The problem of inducing them to act upon this
need and seek public housing is akin to the problem of a lack of interest
among certain baseball fans, a problem so acutely described by Yogi
Berra when he said, "If the people don't want to come out to the ball-
park, nobody's going to stop them." If the white community in Char-
lottesville who formally meet the criteria for eligibility for public hous-
ing do not perceive public housing as a need or as an option which is
viable to them, and if they do not want to put their name on the list of
applicants for public housing, "Nobody's going to stop them."'"
Legal Significance:
Yogi had great insight into the difficult legal area of civil rights when he
said, "Nobody's going to stop them."
". 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Va. 1989).
SId. at 462.
I ld. at 470 n.14.
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Topic: Due Process and Corporal Punishment in Schools
Berraism: "How can I [you] think and hit at the same time?"'65
Legal Application:
In the good old days, teachers didn't have to do much thinking before
exercising their common law privilege of corporal punishment." But in
Goss v. Lopez,'67 the United States Supreme Court ruled that, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, public school students are
entitled to notice and a hearing prior to a suspension of up to ten btays. 6
This informal prior hearing could be conducted by the teacher simultaneously
acting as prosecutor and decisionmaker, need only take seconds, and was
described by the Court itself as "rudimentary."'
169
Still, Goss struck fear into the hearts of public school administrators and
teachers. If a student was entitled to an informal hearing before a suspension
as short as part of one day, what greater due process protections would surely
be required before a student could be struck by a teacher? In Ingraham v.
Wright,70 the Supreme Court assuaged those fears. It held that no notice or
prior hearing at all was required before a student was corporally pun-
ished.'7' The due process rights of students were fully protected by the
availability of a remedy at tort should the teacher exceed the scope of the
common law privilege to use reasonable, nonexcessive force."'
The Ingraham majority reasoned that a prior hearing would delay the pun-
ishment. Further, depending upon the information obtained in the hearing,
' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 149; PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 76.
"'s "Readin" and writin' and 'rithmetic, taught to the tune of a hickory stick" is not a Berraism, but
well sums up the nostalgic view of such days.
10 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
' Id. at 581.
"' Id. at 581-84.
" 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
"' Id. at 674-75. In the immortal (or infamous) footnote 44, the majority acknowledged that, were the
state seeking to physically punish an adult, or even a minor in a nonschool context, the Due Process Clause
would require a full criminal or juvenile court trial. But because, happily, corporal punishment in schools
was traditional and privileged at common law, it could be regarded as a less serious deprivation of liberty.
, Id. at 679 n.47. That remedy, the dissent pointed out, was only available to a student beaten exces-
sively. An innocent student who was wrongly punished, but whose teacher used reasonable, nonexcessive
force, had no remedy at all at tort. Id. at 694 n.1 I.
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the decision to corporally punish might even be reversed. Burdened by delay
and fearing the loss of authority a reversed decision connotes, "[tleachers,
properly concerned with maintaining authority in the classroom, may well
prefer to rely on other disciplinary measures-which they may view as less
effective."'" In other words, they might have to stop and think; and then, of
course, they could not hit.
Legal Significance:
Yogi has never gone on record on the issue of corporal punishment in or
out of school. But he brilliantly summed up the teacher's dilemma to which
the Ingraham majority was sensitive.
Topic: Due Process and Pretrial Detention in Juvenile Court
Berraisms: (1) "How can you say this and that when this and that hasn't
happened yet?"'7
(2) "Foresight is always better, afterward."'75
Legal Application:
Adults charged with crimes have, with very rare exceptions, a right to bail
pending trial. Minors charged with delinquency, however, are routinely "de-
tained," in the juvenile equivalent of a jail, for days or even weeks pending
their juvenile court trials. In Schall v. Martin,'76 the Court heard a challenge
to this practice on due process grounds.
A class of juveniles argued that it violated fundamental fairness for a judge
to hold them based solely on the judge's prediction that they were likely to
commit a crime against a person or property if released.' They presented
at trial statistics showing that of the detained juveniles, one-third eventually
had the charges against them dismissed, and a second third, after trial, were
"' Id. at 680.
"7 PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 76.
"7 Quoted in Gerbers, Ltd. v. Wells County Drainage Bd., 608 N.E. 2d 997, 999 (Ind. App. 1993).
"' 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
" Id. at 262, 278.
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given a "non-secure disposition": that is, were found by the judge not to re-
quire placement in a locked facility.' They argued that this showed that in
two-thirds of the cases the decision to detain before trial was wrong.
79
They also argued that "it is virtually impossible to predict future criminal
conduct with any degree of accuracy."'80 Based on expert testimony and a
review of the scientific research, the trial court found that, "no diagnostic
tools have as yet been devised which enable even the most highly trained
criminologists to predict reliably which juveniles will engage in violent
crime."' 8 ' The juveniles argued that it must violate the Due Process Clause
to deprive them of liberty by a judge's decision which, statistically speaking,
was extremely likely to be wrong.'
Both the trial court and the Second Circuit concluded that the juveniles'
due process rights had been violated. The Supreme Court, however, reversed
and upheld the pretrial detention law. The majority reasoned that dismissing
the charges in one-third of the cases and giving another one-third nonsecure
dispositions did not mean that the initial decisions to detain were wrong. It
just showed leniency consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile
court.83
The Schall Court was well aware of the research showing that it is not
possible, given the current state of psychiatric or psychological knowledge, to
accurately predict dangerous behavior.'" The Court did not dispute the
juveniles' or the trial court's characterization of the scientific research. It sim-
ply said that, "From a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unat-
"' Id. at 262.
I" Id.
Id. at 278. Research has consistently demonstrated that such predictions are frequently, indeed,
usually wrong, and that the error is on the side of false positives (i.e. predicting dangerous acts which do not
occur). See discussion of Barefoot v. Estelle, infra note 184.
" Schall, 467 U.S. at 261 n.12 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 708
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
" Id. at 262.
' Id. at 273.
In Barefoot v. Estelle. 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court considered whether due process was violated
by psychiatric predictions of dangerousness in the death penalty phase of a criminal trial. Amicus curiae
American Psychiatric Association, among other professional groups, informed the Court of "the unanimous
conclusion of professionals in this field that psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are wrong
more often than they are right." Id. at 921. It had heard and rejected similar arguments with respect to pre-
dictions by lay people in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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tainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."'' 5 Such predictions
may be wrong, but the law requires them to be made, and so they can be
made. And because such predictions are made so often and at so many stages
of the criminal justice system, this cannot violate fundamental fairness.
Legal Significance:
A neophyte juvenile court judge, asked to make pretrial detention decisions
and familiar with the professional consensus, might well ask, "How can I say
this and that when this and that hasn't happened yet?" A senior judge, reas-
suring the newcomer that she or he can always rectify error by "leniency" at
disposition time, could say, "Foresight is always better, afterward."
4. TORTS
Topic: Negligence
Berraism: On why the Yankees lost the 1960 World Series to the Pittsburgh
Pirates: "We made too many wrong mistakes."'
8 6
Legal Application:
While Yogi's words at first might seem redundant, they are not. As any
student of the law of negligence knows, there are right mistakes and wrong
mistakes. The reasonable person is not perfect. "To hold that a person does
every voluntary act at his peril, and must insure others against all of the con-
sequences that may occur would, in most instances, be an intolerably heavy
burden upon human activity."'' 7 Before a person can be held liable for neg-
ligence, we must conclude that the harm she caused resulted from a mistake
that a reasonable person, exercising reasonable foresight, would not have
made.' As Holmes wrote:
"' Schall. 467 U.S. at 254.
' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS. supra note 6, at 151; BERRA, supra note 18. at 8; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 44; PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 151.
"' W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 at 163 (5th ed. 1984).
Reasonably prudent people do not make the wrong kind of mistakes. As one scholar wrote, "A
motorist who did not watch the road would hardly think of arguing that he or she used the care of a reason-
ably-prudent-person-not-keeping-a-proper-lookout-areasonably-prudent-person-not-keeping-a-proper-look-
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The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie
where it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human
being is the instrument of misfortune. But relatively to a given human
being anything is accident which he could not fairly have been expected
to contemplate as possible, and therefore to avoid. "9
Take the well-known case of Brown v. Kendall.'o A dog belonging to the
defendant was involved in a fight with a dog belonging to the plaintiff. To
break up the fight, defendant picked up a stick and began beating the dogs.
The defendant raised the stick above his shoulder and accidentally struck and
injured the plaintiff. Clearly, defendant hurt the plaintiff, and in doing so
made a mistake. But unless this was the wrong kind of mistake, defendant
could not be held responsible. If defendant was exercising "ordinary care,"
plaintiff could not recover. 9"
Legal Significance:
A person acting reasonably makes the right kind of mistakes; one acting
unreasonably makes the wrong kind. Apparently, Mr. Kendall made the for-
mer kind; at least in the judgment of Yogi Berra, the 1960 Yankees made too
many of the latter type.
Topic: Negligence/Litigation
Berraism: "Foresight is always better, afterward."'92
Legal Application # 1:
A fundamental principle of the law of negligence holds that the reasonable-
ness of a person's conduct is to be judged from the perspective of foresight,
not hindsight.9 ' Yogi Berra put it best. Baron Bramwell perhaps stated it
out is a contradiction in terms." CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR.. MORRIS ON TORTS 49 (2d
ed. 1980).
"K OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
'" 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
' Id. at 296.
I,, Quoted in Gerbers, Ltd. v. Wells County Drainage Bd., 608 N.E. 2d 997, 999 (Ind. App. 1993).
"' "The actor's conduct must be judged in the light of the possibilities apparent to him at the time,
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second best when he wrote, "Nothing is so easy as to be wise after the
event.""' Or, somewhat less elegantly and in a slightly different context, it
has been written that "no court should strike down a reasonable liquidated
damage agreement based on foresight that has proved on hindsight to have
contained an inaccurate estimation of the probable loss ...
Legal Significance:
Assume a victim of accidental injury claims the defendant failed to use
reasonable care in preventing the accident. We judge the defendant's conduct
from the perspective of what a reasonable person looking forward would have
considered safe, and not what we can determine with the benefit of hindsight.
Legal Application # 2:
Sometimes an issue argued is not reached by the court. A case in point: in
Gerbers, Ltd. v. Wells County Drainage Board,' plaintiffs property was
damaged by flood waters from a massive rainstorm (characterized by an ex-
pert witness as a "100-year storm"). Plaintiffs claimed that had the County
Drainage Board not approved a third party's request to fill a drainage ditch
to create a parking lot, the flood would not have occurred. The Board moved
for summary judgment on the ground that when it granted the third party's
petition, it was exercising a discretionary function as to which it was statuto-
rily immune.'97
The court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. This meant
it did not have to decide whether the Drainage Board should have taken into
account the possibility that in a "100-year flood," the absence of the drainage
ditch might prove disastrous to surrounding property owners. The court
would have had to decide that question only if it had first concluded that the
and not by looking backward 'with the wisdom born of the event."' KEETON EF AL., supra note 187, at
170. (quoting Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.)).
" Comman v. Eastern Counties Ry., 157 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1052 (1859).
"' 3A WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2A-
504:02 (Art. 2A) (1982).
" 608 N.E. 2d 997 (Ind. App. 1993).
'' Id. at 998.
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Board was not immune. But as the court made clear, the Board's decision
was, indeed, discretionary, rendering it immune from liability.'
Legal Significance:
Yogi was right. Foresight is always better, afterward. Or, to put it in a far
less elegant way, if plaintiffs lawyers possessed the wisdom of hindsight,
they would have realized it was unnecessary to discuss the "100-year flood,"
and that doing so was a waste of time. But neither they nor other litigators
can be blamed for lacking hindsight beforehand. Still, good luck explaining
the bill to the client.
Topic: Assault
Berraism: After a 1973 playoff game between the Mets, managed by Yogi,
and the Reds, Yogi was asked whether he had been apprehensive
in the twelfth inning. Yogi answered, "No, but I was scared.""'
Legal Application:
The tort of assault is committed when an actor "acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of another or of a third person,
or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and ... the other is thereby
put in such imminent apprehension. '' 2' The term "apprehension," in turn, is
defined as follows:
In order that the other may be put in the apprehension necessary to
make the actor liable for an assault, the other must believe that the act
may result in imminent contact unless prevented from so resulting by the
other's self-defensive action or by his flight or by the intervention of
some outside force. 20 1
608 N.E. 2d at 999-1000.
" BERRA, supra note 18, at II Ross PETRAS & KATHRYN PETRAS, PAGE-A-DAY CALENDAR, THE
365 STUPIDEST THINGS EVER SAID, Aug. 19, 1996 (1996 ed.) (The Reds won the game on a Pete Rose
home run.). As the discussion to follow will demonstrate, Yogi's statement was anything but stupid. Per-
haps we can forgive the collectors of calendar trivia, who, unlike baseball philosophers, are not expected to
understand the intricacies of the law.
. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
." Id. § 24.
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As a close reading of the above will demonstrate, "apprehension" is not the
same as "fear." The drafters of the Restatement explain:
It is not necessary that the other believe that the act done by the actor
will be effective in inflicting the intended contact upon him. It is enough
that he believes that the act is capable of immediately inflicting the con-
tact upon him unless something further occurs.2 2
Thus, if White Sox second baseman Ray Durham,2 3 who stands five feet
eight, drops his bat and rushes the mound after a brushback pitch by six foot
ten inch Randy Johnson,2° Johnson is not likely to fear that the little guy
will be able to do him any harm. But Johnson might well be apprehensive
nonetheless, because he knows that unless he does something to defend him-
self, or unless his teammates intervene in time, he might suffer imminent
contact-more likely offensive than harmful.
Legal Significance:
Yogi Berra understood the essence25 of the distinction between fear and
apprehension. In the twelfth inning of a baseball game as in many situations
in life, almost anything can happen. There is plenty to fear when it's the
twelfth inning, particularly if the other team has its big guys coming up and
your pitchers haven't had much luck getting them out lately.
. Id. at cmt. b.
-' Ray Durham weighs 170 pounds. In 1995, he started 118 games at second base, hit .257, and had
51 runs batted in. He tied for sixth place in the balloting for American League Rookie of the Year. Official
Site of Major League Baseball, at <http://vvw.majorleaguebaseball.com/bios/600097.sml>.
'0 Randy Johnson is a southpaw pitcher for the Seattle Mariners. He stands 6 feet 10 inches and
weighs 225. In 1995, he was the American League Cy Young Award Winner after posting an 18-2 record
and leading the league with 294 strikeouts. Id.
2'" Mr. Berm missed just one limited aspect of the legal distinction between fear and apprehension.
Under the definition, fear is in fact a subset of apprehension, meaning that if one is fearful, one is necessari-
ly apprehensive, but not vice versa. Thus, to be completely accurate from a legal perspective, perhaps Mr.
Berra should have answered the question by saying, "Yeah, I'm apprehensive, and I'm scared, too."
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Topic: Comparative Negligence, Joint and Several Liability, and Good
Faith Settlements
Berraism: Yogi's theory of baseball, a thinking person's game: "Ninety
percent of the game is half mental."" °
Legal Application:
Yogi's math was not erroneous. Rather, when he was equating ninety
percent with half, he was illustrating how a settlement between the plaintiff
and one joint tortfeasor will affect the ultimate amount that the settling
tortfeasor is required to pay.
Assume that plaintiff is injured in the amount of $100,000 by joint
tortfeasors A and B, and A is found to be ninety percent at fault and B is
found to be ten percent at fault. Under the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity, each joint tortfeasor is personally liable for the total amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, at least as far as economic losses are concerned. As
a result, the plaintiff may recover the entire amount of his damages from any
joint tortfeasor found liable, regardless of the percentage of fault of that par-
ticular tortfeasor.2"7 Thus, if plaintiff chose, he could recover the entire
$100,000 or any part of it from defendant B. Then B, through a lawsuit for
partial indemnity, could obtain reimbursement from the other tortfeasor in
proportion to the fault attributable to each.28 As an example, if plaintiff
collected the entire $100,000 from B, who was ten percent at fault, B could
assert a claim for partial indemnity against defendant A and could recover
from A the amount of the judgment that B paid in excess of A's percentage
of fault. Therefore, defendant B could recover $90,000 from defendant A.
However, one important roadblock exists for the joint tortfeasor who has
paid more than her proportionate share of plaintiffs damages and seeks to
reapportion the loss among the other tortfeasors by a suit for partial indem-
nity. This hurdle is a good faith settlement. If one joint tortfeasor settles with
the plaintiff prior to trial, and that settlement is found to be in good faith, the
other joint tortfeasors are prohibited from seeking partial indemnity from the
. DICKSON, supra note 10, at 44; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
" See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1978).
'I ld. at 907.
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settling joint tortfeasor.2" Instead, the dollar amount of the settlement is
simply deducted from the amount the plaintiff may recover from the non-
settling joint tortfeasor. Assume, in our example, that before trial, defendant
A settled with the plaintiff for $50,000. If the settlement is found to be in
good faith and the jury entered the same judgment of $100,000 in the trial
against nonsettling defendant B, the $50,000 settlement would be subtracted
from the amount that plaintiff could recover from B. Under the rule of joint
and several liability, B would be required to pay the entire remaining $50,000
to the plaintiff. However, B would have no claims for partial indemnity to
redistribute any of the $50,000 loss back to A.
Therefore, because of A's good faith settlement with the plaintiff,
tortfeasor A who was ninety percent at fault, would end up paying only
$50,000, or half, of plaintiffs judgment.
Legal Significance:
If a defendant who is ninety percent at fault can end up having to pay only
half of plaintiff's damages, ninety percent of the game can equal half.
Topic: False Imprisonment
Berraism: Explaining declining attendance in Kansas City: "If people don't
want to come to the ballpark, how are you going to stop
them?"21
0
Background:
Yogi's rhetorical question captures the essence of the law which says that
an individual may not by unlawful compulsion be restricted in his freedom of
movement.2 ' His question relates not only to Kansas City attendance, but
also to what has been called the greatest pennant race in baseball history."'
In the race for the 1908 National League pennant, a game between the New
:" CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1985).
BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6. at 150; DICKSON, supra note 10, at 43; LEDERER, supra note
18, at 134: PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 151.
2" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35-45 (1965).
2'2 JAMES. supra note 2, at 66.
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York Giants and the Chicago Cubs ended in a 1-1 tie because the Giants'
Fred Merkle pulled his famous "bonehead play." This forced a playoff game
for the National League pennant between the two clubs, which gave rise to
this false imprisonment case.
211
Legal Application:
In Talcott v. National Exhibition Co.,214 plaintiff on the morning of an
afternoon playoff game went to the ballpark to buy a ticket. He entered an
enclosure within the park where there were ticket booths. He found that the
game was sold out. He and others in the same situation sought to leave the
park through the enclosure's ingress and egress gates. However, the game
was of such intense interest to the fans that they arrived early at the park, lit-
erally by the thousands. Apparently because of the flow of the arriving crowd
through the gates to the enclosure, the ballpark police restrained plaintiff and
others from leaving the park through those gates and failed to show them
alternate means of leaving. After more than an hour of being forced to re-
main in the ballpark, plaintiff and his friends finally were led through the
clubhouse and out to the street through the clubhouse door. Plaintiff sued for
false imprisonment and won both at trial and on appeal." 5
21' L. RITTER, THE GLORY OF THEIR TIMES, 98-100, 124-218 (1966). "Merkle's boner" happened this
way. The first-place Giants were playing the second-place Cubs near the end of the season. The score was
one to one when the Giants came to bat in the bottom of the ninth inning. There were two outs with runners
on first and third, Merkle being on first. The Giants' batter. Al Bridwell, lashed the ball to centerfield for an
apparent game-winning single. The runner on third came home, but Merkle, halfway to second, immediately
raced into the clubhouse without bothering to touch second base. Merkle followed the common practice of
the time. The jubilant Giant fans piled onto the field. Meanwhile, Cubs second baseman Johnny Evers called
for the ball and touched second base, forcing out Merkle for the third out, nullifying the apparent game-
winning run. Umpire Hank O'Day called Merkle out, disallowing the run, and called the game a tie be-
cause darkness precluded continuing. The game grew in importance when the teams ended the season tied
for first place. The tie game was rescheduled for the Giants' park, the Polo Grounds, and a record 35,000
spectators crammed into the stadium and watched Cubs pitcher Three-Finger Brown best the Giants' Christy
Mathewson four to two to give the Cubs their third consecutive National League crown. It was this playoff
game that inspired our use of the present Berraism. Incidentally, the Cubs went on to defeat the Detroit
Tigers in the World Series, four games to one. The reason the run did not score on Merkle's boner was
that a run may not score when the third out in an inning is made by a force out. Id. 1996 OFFICIAL RULES
OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL [hereinafter 1996 OFFICIAL RULES], Rule 4.09(a)(2), at 32; THE BEST OF
BASEBALL, supra note 2. at 81; DAN GUTMAN, BASEBALL'S BIGGEST BLOOPERS 2-13 (Puffin Books
1995): SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6, at 40. 43; THE ULTIMATE BASEBALL BOOK 73 (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1991).
-14 128 N.Y.S. 1059 (App. Div. 1911).
2-" Id. at 1059-60.
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Legal Significance:
This case answers Yogi's question "If people don't want to come to the
ballpark, how are you going to stop them?" You imprison them at the ball-
park.
Topic: Right to Publicity
Berraism: On his recognizability: "Most everybody knows me by my
face.
21 6
Legal Application:
Yogi's statement reflects his awareness that celebrities have a commercial
interest in their faces, along with other recognizable characteristics. In Yo-
gi's case, not only is he recognized by his face, but he is also known for his
walk, his wit, and his wisdom.1 7 Under the common law right to publicity,
the value of an individual's name, 21  likeness, 2 9  achievements,
221
identifying characteristics, 2 ' and identity,2 22 is protected, and courts per-
mit celebrities to recover damages for the misappropriation of their images.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated this common law right to
publicity in a case in which Johnny Carson, the host and star of The Tonight
Show, sought damages and an injunction prohibiting a Michigan corporation,
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., from using the phrase, "Here's John-
ny" as a corporate name in connection with the sale or rental of portable
toilets.223 In that case, the defendant's founder was aware at the time he
formed the corporation that "Here's Johnny" was the introductory slogan for
PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 154.
17 See, e.g.. id.
"" See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d. 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).
2 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
See. e.g., Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).
2.. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bembach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (App. Div. 1977);
Prudhomme v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1992).
222 See. e.g., White v. Samsung Elect. Am.. Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 849 F. 2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
.' Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F. 2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Carson on The Tonight Show.224 He also indicated that he coupled the
phrase, "Here's Johnny," with a second phrase, "The World's Foremost
Commodian," because it was a good play on words."' In upholding Car-
son's right to publicity claim, the Sixth Circuit noted that even though de-
fendant had not appropriated Carson's identity by using Carson's name, it
was the misappropriation of Carson's identifying phrase that constituted an
invasion of Carson's right to publicity.2 6 As the Sixth Circuit explained,
"[t]he right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of
celebrities in their identities. The theory of the right is that.., the celebrity
has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial ex-
ploitation of that identity.... If the celebrity's identity is commercially
exploited, there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his 'name or
likeness' is used. 2
27
Legal Significance:
Far more succinctly than the Sixth Circuit, Yogi has captured the essence
of the common law right to publicity. Not only does Yogi's face have a
protected value, but so does his wit and wisdom. In fact, some may argue
that it is priceless.
5. CONTRACTS
Topic: Contract Interpretation
Berraism: A friend came to Yogi's house with a dog in the back of his car.
He asked Yogi, "What do you think of my daughter's Afghan?"
Yogi said, "Looks nice. I am thinking about a Vega." '228
2'4 Id. at 833.
-" Id.
-' Id. at 837.
• Id. at 835.
' BERRA, supra note 18. at 11-12.
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Legal Application:
Yogi's conversation with his friend demonstrates nicely the doctrine of
misunderstanding in contract law. A misunderstanding regarding the meaning
of a material term may result in no contract being formed.2 9 If party A,
however, is aware of the meaning attached by party B, while party B is un-
aware of the meaning attached by party A, the meaning attached by party B
will control. 3 In Yogi's conversation, it would appear that Yogi was un-
aware of the meaning that his friend attached to the word "Afghan," while
presumably the friend was aware of Yogi's understanding. If this were a
contract, the friend would be bound to Yogi's interpretation. Parol evidence
should be admissible to sort things out.
Legal Significance:
Yogi's conversation demonstrates the folly of attempting to interpret a
contract according to its "plain meaning." What may seem to be a "plain
meaning" to you or me is not necessarily the meaning attached by the parties
to a contract.
6. PROPERTY
Topic: The Rule Against Perpetuities23 '
Berraisms: After seeing the Steve McQueen movie, The Magnificent Sev-
en:21 2 "He made that picture before he died." 3
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20. For examples of cases involving misunderstandings,
see Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) (the Peerless case); Frigaliment Im-
porting Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("what is chicken?") (for a new
perspective on-the "chicken" case, see Horowitz et al., supra note 36, at 195 n.37).
. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2)(a).
" The Rule is discussed in another scholarly legal essay. See Horowitz et al., supra note 35, at 191
n.5. For an illustrated critique of the use of more traditional authority (from which one can conclude that a
gratuitous, self-referential footnote such as this one is no worse), see Keith Aoki & Garret Epps, Dead
Lines. Break Downs & Troubling the Legal Subject or "Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Meta," 73 OR. L.
REV. 551 (1994); see also Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 168 n.6
(1990) ("And so here I was all of a sudden, reduced to a supporting role. This was my text and somehow I
had landed in the footnote. How awful.").
" United Artists 1960.
" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS. supra note 6, at 149; BERRA, supra note 18, at 6; DICKSON, supra note
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or
Discussing his relief pitchers as the Mets' manager in 1973: "If
you ain't got a bullpen, you ain't got nothin'.
Legal Application:
The parallels between the logic of Yogi Berra and the logic of the Rule
Against Perpetuities are uncanny. The Rule Against Perpetuities is supposed
to limit the control of the dead hand over property, and more specifically,
over future interests. The key to creating a transfer that could take effect long
into the future and yet still be valid under the Rule is to use a long-lived
class of measuring lives. For according to the Rule, an interest is valid if it
vests or fails to vest within a life (or lives) in being plus 21 years. If the life
in being is already elderly, one's ability to control the future will last little
more than 21 years. But if the life is young and strong, one's ability to con-
trol the future possession of the property may extend for decades beyond the
transferor's death ("He made that picture before he died'). Designating a
class of measuring lives, rather than hoping that no illness or accident ever
overtakes one measuring life, maximizes the chances that the valid perpetu-
ities period will extend well beyond 21 years. As Yogi said, "ifyou ain't got
a bullpen, you ain t got nothin'."
In applying the Rule Against Perpetuities, one is supposed to assume that a
woman, no matter her age, is capable of bearing children. Lord Kenyon first
stated this assumption in Jee v. Audley,23 a case in which a transfer to the
daughters of John and Elizabeth Jee was declared invalid because Kenyon
assumed that Elizabeth Jee, then 70 years old, might have a daughter some-
time in the future whose interest would vest beyond the perpetuities period.
Despite this case, Lord Kenyon became Lord Chief Justice of England in
1788. The assumption made law in Jee is now referred to as the Rule of the
Fertile Octogenarian, but it might as well be called the "it's not over 'til it's
over" '6 rule. Of course, it should be noted that in recent years, procreative
technology use has enabled postmenopausal women to bear children. So the
10, at 42; PEPE, supra note 8, at 152.
2 DICKSON, supra note 10, at 43.
as I Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
z Yogi on the Mets' chances in the 1973 National League East pennant race. BASEBALL QUOTATIONS.
supra note 6, at 150; BERRA. supra note 18, at 5; DICKSON. supra note 10, at 43; PEPE, supra note 8. at
151.
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Rule of the Fertile Octogenarian may seem a bit less absurd these days. On
the other hand, one still could have said to Lord Kenyon, "How can you'say
this and that when this and that hasn 't happened yet? "37
Kenyon's response would be that one is supposed to imagine all possibili-
ties under the Rule. For example, under the Rule, an interest that follows a
transfer "to X for life, then to X's widow, if any, for life," will fail. In ap-
plying the Rule, you first look for a measuring life, and then determine
whether the future interest will certainly vest or not vest within that person's
life and 21 years. Further, in applying the Rule, you must say this and that
even if this and that haven't happened yet (although many agree that Lord
Kenyon took this a bit too far). If it's possible that the interest might vest
after a period longer than the measuring life and 21 years, the interest is
invalid at law. In this transfer, the law says that even if X is currently mar-
ried, one cannot use X's spouse as a measuring life. In other words, it is
possible, within the world one must imagine under the Rule, that X might
remarry some time in the future, and that X's future spouse will be someone
not yet born. The measuring life must be someone alive at the time of the
transfer. (Do you mean now?" Yes.) That means that only X can be used
as the measuring life. The interest following the life estate in X's widow is
invalid because of the following possibility: X might remarry someone born
after this transfer, then X's widow might live more than 21 years after X's
death. Any interest following X's widow's life estate would then vest be-
yond X's life and 21 years. That possibility is called the Rule of the Unborn
Widow.
Topic: Finders Keepers
Berraism: "When you come to the fork in the road, take it.""2
Legal Application:
This summary of the law crudely known as "finders keepers" is less ele-
gant than Yogi's usual standard. It fails to distinguish between public and
" PETRAS & PETRAS, supra note 29, at 76.
"- Yogi said this when he was asked by another player for the correct time. BASEBALL QUOTATIONS,
supra note 6, at 152; PEPE, supra note 8, at 153; BERRA. supra note 18, at 9.
2" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; BERRA, supra note 18, at 7.
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private roads and the incidents of a finder's rights that derive from the dis-
tinction.24 A careless student might assume that it applies alike to knives
and spoons, little realizing the decreasing probabilities that a knife, fork, or
spoon may have been an instrument of homicide and thus forfeit as deo-
dand. 241' And it completely overlooks the prospect that an outdoor fork
sculpture is a fixture, defined as realty,2 4 with a chattel past and the fear of
a chattel future when Paul Bunyan wanders by in search of a snack.
7. BUSINESS LAW
Topic: Choosing a Corporate Name
Berraism: "Little League baseball is a very good thing because it keeps the
parents off the streets" 43 and "the kids out of the house."
'2M
or
"If you can't imitate him, don't copy him."2 45
Legal Application:
Corporations are statutorily created entities. They exist only pursuant to the
terms stated in the jurisdiction in which a corporation is formed. The terms
set out in these statutes include rules by which a corporation can choose its
name. Traditionally, such rules do not allow a new corporation to choose a
name that is "so similar to any [name of an existing corporation] as to tend to
confuse or deceive.
'246
2'" Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 L.J.R. 75 (Q.B. 1851), as reinterpreted in South Staffordshire Water
Co. v. Sharman, 2 Q.B. 44 (Q.B. 1896).
:' See Austin v. United States. 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993).
• But see Ronald W. Polston, The Fixtures Doctrine: Was It Ever Really the Law?, 16 WHITr7ER L.
REV. 455 (1995).
' DICKSON, supra note 10. at 44.
. BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150 PEPE, supra note 8, at 187.
2'" Yogi said this when Ron Swoboda told Yogi, then a Mets' coach, that he liked to crowd the plate
like Frank Robinson. BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; DICKSON, supra note 10, at 43: PETRAS
& PETRAS. supra note 29, at 76.
'" N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 301 (a)(2) (McKinney 1996). More modem formulations of statutes governing
corporate names merely provide that a new corporation's name "must be distinguishable upon the records of
the secretary of state" from the name of a currently incorporated entity. See, e.g.. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
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In 1959 a would-be corporation in New York submitted its certificate of
incorporation. The corporation's stated purpose was "to stimulate interest in
the American institution known as 'baseball' among boys between the ages
of 13 to 20 years. '247 The proposed name of this entity was the New York
Braves Baseball Club, Inc." 8 Although lauding the stated purposes of the
proposed corporation, the court rejected the application because the proposed
name would lead to confusion both from the use of "New York... Baseball
Club" (given the existence of the New York Yankees) and the use of
"Braves" (given the existence of the Milwaukee Braves).249
Legal Significance:
Like the New York Supreme Court, Yogi saw merit in Little League-type
organizations, but he also cautioned against inappropriate imitation.
Topic: Fiduciary Duty of a Corporate Board Member
Berraism: On why the Yankees lost the 1960 World Series to the Pitts-
burgh Pirates: "We made too many wrong mistakes.""2
Legal Application:
As noted earlier in this Essay,25" ' there can be right mistakes and wrong
mistakes. Members of a corporate board of directors are regularly required to
make decisions in the best interests of the corporation. When the decisions
they make turn out badly, directors are often sued. However, most courts give
directors' decisions the benefit of the business judgment rule, which is a pre-
sumption that the directors have acted informedly, in good faith, and in the
best interests of the company.2 The standard used to measure their
§ 4.01(b)(1) (1991).
7 Application of New York Braves Baseball Club, Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 80, 80-81 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
2" Id. at 80.
-' Id. at 81-82.
" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 151; BERRA, supra note 18, at 8; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 44; PEPE, supra note 8, at 151.
" See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 345-51, 356-57 and accom-
panying texts.
'2 See, e.g.. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871-72 (Del. 1985): Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
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decisionmaking is one of gross negligence or a showing of some other seri-
ously improper basis such as fraud or illegality. '53 Thus, a director will not
be held personally liable for mere negligent decisionmaking.
In Shlensky v. Wrigley,' the plaintiff was a minority shareholder in the
Chicago National League Ball Club (Inc.). The Club owned and operated the
Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field, the Cubs' home park. The plaintiff brought
a shareholder derivative action against the Club and its directors seeking
damages and an order to require the directors to install lights at Wrigley Field
and hold night games. The plaintiff alleged that director-defendant Philip K.
Wrigley dominated the board of directors and had refused to install lights for
personal reasons, rather than reasons related to the interests of the corpora-
tion." s The trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint was upheld on
appeal because the decision was a proper one for the directors, and plaintiff
had made no showing that the directors' conduct even bordered on fraud,
illegality, or conflict of interest. 6
Legal Significance:
Unless directors' decisions are blatantly contrary to a corporation's best
interests, courts are unwilling to interfere with the directors' judgment of
what is best for their company even when those decisions cause the company
to operate in the red. As the Shlensky court said, "mere failure to 'follow the
crowd' is not ... a dereliction [of duty]" 257 or, as Yogi would have put it,
"is not a wrong mistake."
N.E.2d 776, 778-79 (I1. App. Ct. 1968).
" See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873; Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
2-'4 237 N.E.2d 776.
2' At the time of this shareholder derivative suit, 19 of the 20 major league teams were holding night
games. The Cubs, holding only day games, had sustained operating losses in the previous four years. Plain-
tiff asserted that night games would increase attendance and revenues at home games. Id, at 777. Wrigley,
however, personally believed "that baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the installation of lights and night
baseball games (would] have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood." Id. at 778.
Id. at 780.
237 Id. at 781.
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Topic: Avoidance of Material Misstatements by a Company in Merger
Talks
Berraism: "Listen up, because I've got nothing to say and I'm only going to
say it once.""2
or
"I wish I had an answer to that because I'm getting tired of an-
swering that question." '259
Legal Application:
A corporation whose stock is publicly traded must be very careful about
the statements its agents make during merger negotiations. This is because
federal securities statutes and rules prohibit fraud in connection with stock
trading. Fraud is defined broadly and includes "any untrue statement of a
material fact" or the omission of "a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made ... not misleading."2" The fact that a company has
initiated merger talks is of great interest to the trading public because traders
know that typically a premium will be offered above the normal trading price
for the stock of the company to be acquired.26 ' If rumors develop that a
company may be acquired, trading will increase in its shares as people try to
get "on board" in an attempt to share in the ultimate premium price.
However, it is in the company's best interest not to reveal information
about merger negotiations, so that increased trading will not occur. Such trad-
ing might increase the price and possibly even cause the deal to fall
through.262 Thus, if rumors develop and the company is questioned, it will
" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 151.
' As Yankee manager in 1984, this was Yogi's response when asked why the team was losing.
BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; DICKSON, supra note 10, at 42; PETRAS & PETRAS, supra
note 29, at 76.
:' 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1996). See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (1989).
'" See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227-28 & nA (1988) (announcement of acquiring
company's offer of $46 per share, when two months earlier shares were valued at only $25).
262 See Levinson, 485 U.S. at 233 (petitioner arguing that not requiring corporate disclosure of the
existence of merger negotiation until after an agreement'in principle was reached would "help[] preserve the
confidentiality of merger discussions where earlier disclosure might prejudice the negotiations"); Flamm v.
Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that "premature disclosure may frustrate the achievement
of the firm's objective, destroying the source of the value sought to be disclosed"); Greenfield v. Heublein,
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want to deny that negotiations are in progress. However, such a denial could
be a violation of the federal antifraud laws. The United States Supreme Court
has, therefore, suggested that "no comment" would be the appropriate re-
sponse by a company whenever it is asked a 'question concerning the exis-
tence of merger talks.263
Legal Significance:
Given the Supreme Court's ruling, either of Yogi's statements would seem
to be appropriate examples of responses a corporate agent could provide to a
merger talk inquiry and still avoid violation of the federal securities antifraud
rules.
Topic: The Enforceability of Agreements Between Corporate
Shareholders
Berraism: "You've got to be very careful if you don't know where you are
going, because you might not get there. ' 21
Legal Application:
Under the traditional structure created by most states' corporate legislation,
shareholders elect the directors and directors appoint the officers.265 If cor-
porate participants try to vary this structure, they may not get the results they
expect.
In 1919, three men entered into an agreement whereby they would achieve
control of the National Exhibition Company, whose business was to operate a
National League baseball club in New York City, popularly called "the Gi-
ants" and playing at the Polo Grounds.26 Under this agreement, Charles A.
Inc.. 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984) ("considering the delicate nature of most merger discussions, (early
disclosure] might seriously inhibit such acquisitive ventures").
" See Levinson, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17.
' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 152; DICKSON. supra note 10, at 45.
2" See N.Y. Bus. CORP. §§ 614(a), 715(a) (McKinney 1996); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.28(a),
8.40(a) (1991).
2' See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 235 (N.Y. 1934).
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Stoneham became the majority shareholder, and John J. McGraw and Francis
X. McQuade each bought a portion of Stoneham's interest.267 The three men
further agreed that each would "use their best endeavors" to continue each
other as both directors and officers of the corporation.2"
All went well pursuant to the agreement until Stoneham and McQuade had
a falling out. Stoneham caused substantial funds to be loaned to himself from
the corporate treasury, which led McQuade to insist on security and inter-
est.269 In 1928, McQuade was ousted as treasurer when Stoneham and
McGraw abstained from voting and the other four directors, all Stoneham
nominees, voted for a replacement treasurer.27° McQuade was also dropped
as director at the 1928 shareholder meeting as a result of Stoneham's and
McGraw's lack of support.27'
McQuade sued to enforce the shareholder agreement. New York's highest
court ruled that corporate shareholders could combine their votes to elect
directors.2 However, because McQuade had not asked for damages arising
from the loss of his directorship, he was given no remedy for the breach of
that part of the agreement.2 3 As for the shareholder agreement's provision
to retain McQuade as treasurer, the New York Court of Appeals found the
agreement invalid because it interfered with the directors' duty to exercise
independent judgment by inhibiting them in removing or changing officers,
salaries, or policies.274
.' Id. McGraw was the Giants' manager, id., while McQuade brought the parties together to buy the
controlling interest. McQuade v. Stoneham, 256 N.Y.S. 431, 436 (1932), rev'd 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934).
'" Id. (quoting section Vill of the agreement, which specified that Stoneham was to be president;
McGraw, vice president; and McQuade, treasurer, as well as their salaries).
2' McQuade, 242 N.Y.S. at 55 1.
." McQuade, 189 N.E. at 235.
271 Id.
2'2 Id. at 236 (citing Brightman v. Bates, 55 N.E. 809, 811 (Mass. 1900)). See also N.Y. Bus. CORP.
§ 620(a) (McKinney 1996); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.31 (1991).
"' See McQuade, 256 N.Y.S. at 441. The lower court awarded McQuade damages for his removal as
treasurer, but the award was reversed when the Court of Appeals ruled that part of the agreement invalid.
See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
2" McQuade, 189 N.E. at 236. Later rulings by the New York Court of Appeals upheld shareholder
agreements that went beyond combining to elect directors if the agreements involved all of the shareholders
and their terms caused only a slight impingement on the directors' powers. See, e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 199
N.E. 641, 642-43 (N.Y. 1936). Since the McQuade case, the New York legislature has amended its corpora-
tion code to allow, under certain circumstances, shareholder agreements of the type Stoneham, McGraw, and
McQuade attempted to form. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 620(b)-(g) (McKinney 1996); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 7.32 (1991).
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Legal Significance:
Mr. McQuade learned the hard way that simply having a contract doesn't
assure you the results you'd hoped for. As Yogi said: "You've got to be very
careful if you don't know where you are going, because you might not get
there."
Topic: Banking
Berraism: On the shadows in left field at Yankee Stadium in the fall: "It
gets late early out there." '275
Legal Application:
Yogi was, of course, referring to the so-called "midnight deadline" rule for
collecting banks."6 When it learns that a check has not been paid, a collect-
ing bank should normally send a notice of dishonor to the bank's transferor
before midnight of the next banking day following the banking day it re-
ceived the check. A collecting bank does not usually have more time to effect
this notice.
Legal Significance:
It does get late early out there in the world of checks, drafts, and collecting
banks.
8. INSURANCE LAW
Topic: Statutory Interpretation/Bad Faith
Berraisms: "It's not over 'til it's over."277
2', BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 1501; BERRA, supra note 18, at II; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 43; LEDERER, supra note 18, at 134; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
" See U.C.C. §§ 4-104(1)(b), 4-202.
277 Yogi was describing the Mets' chances in the 1973 National League East pennant race. BASEBALL
QUOTATIONS. supra note 6. at 150: BERRA. supra note 18, at 7: DICKSON, supra note 10, at 43: PEPE, supra
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or
"You're never out of it 'til you're out of it.
278
Legal Application:
Commencing in 1979, the California Supreme Court's four to three deci-
sion in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of Butte County,279 in-
terpreting the state Insurance Code, permitted a private litigant to bring an ac-
tion to impose civil liability on an insurance company for engaging in unfair
claims settlement practices.280 The majority opinion was authored by Justice
Stanley Mosk. In 1988, Royal Globe was overruled by a 5-2 majority.
In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund,- ' the court held that the Insurance
Code was not intended to create a private civil cause of action in third parties
against insurers who commit certain acts listed in the Code.
Justice Mosk led off his dissent with these words: "Royal Globe (1979-
1988), may it Rest in Peace. 282
Legal Significance:
Justice Mosk seems to have grasped a corollary of Yogi's boundless opti-
mism by firmly and plainly acknowledging when it was, in fact, over.
9. TAXATION
Topic: Annual Accounting
Berraism: "It's not over 'til it's over.
283
note 8, at 151.
" This is a variation on Yogi's "It's not over 'til it's over." DICKSON, supra note 10, at 45.
27' 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) (en banc). overruled ky 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988) (en bane).
: Id. at 332-35.
z" 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
I ld. at 75 (citations omitted).
: BASEBALL QUOTATIONS. supra note 6, at 150; BERRA, supra note 18, at 7; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 43; PEPE, supra note 8, at 151.
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Legal Application:
Yogi would have made a great tax nerd; his words capture the essence of a
group of special transactional accounting rules that often perplex students in
the basic federal income tax course. Our federal income tax system requires
taxpayers to report income and loss on an annual basis; once a specific year
ends, it is "over" for tax purposes."8 However, some transactions span dif-
ferent tax years, and the rigid use of an annual accounting period can result
in unfairness to taxpayers. 85 Consistent with Yogi's observation that "[i]t's
not over 'til it's over," Congress and the courts have fashioned a number of
special transactional accounting rules that ameliorate some of the harsh ef-
fects of the annual accounting rule.2"6
Suppose2 7 that, in year one, Emma and Claire wrote a computer program
but could not sell it. In year three, Claire modified the program and sold it.
Claire received $60,000 in royalties on the program during year three and,
believing that she was entitled to all of the royalties, did not give any of the
money to Emma. Claire, who paid federal income tax at a 40% rate in year
three, reported the royalties as income on her tax return for year three and
paid $24,000 (40% of $60,000) of federal income tax on that income. In year
four, Emma sued Claire, and a jury awarded Emma $30,000 (half of the
$60,000 of royalties Claire received in year three) and half of all future royal-
ties from the program.
I.R.C. § 441 (West 1986 & West Supp. 1996).
' For example, in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) (simplifying the facts of the
case), the taxpayer reported net losses on a dredging contract for the years 1913 through 1916 of$ 175,000.
In 1920, the taxpayer recovered $175,000 in a lawsuit related to the dredging contract. The taxpayer exclud-
ed the $175,000 from income, reasoning that there was no income from the entire transaction. The Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer's income and loss must be determined separately for each year, so that the
$175,000 recovery in 1920 was income even though the taxpayer had $175,000 of related losses in the earli-
er years for which it received no tax benefit. In effect, the Court held that tax years 1913 through 1916 were
"over," and the losses from those years could not offset the income received in 1920. Id.
' For example, after the decision in the Burnet case, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code § 172.
This section provides that, if a taxpayer has a net loss for a tax year, the taxpayer can "carry" the loss back
three years and forward fifteen years. The loss carryback and carryforward can offset net income in other
years, reducing the taxpayer's tax liability in profitable years. If § 172 had applied at the time of the Burnet
case, the taxpayer would have had no net income in 1920; instead, the $175,000 received in 1920 would
have been offset by the taxpayer's losses from the years 1913 through 1916.
2" This example is loosely based on an example in JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 95 (1996).
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Can Claire amend her tax return for year three, showing $30,000 less of
income, and get a refund of the $12,000 in tax she paid on the $30,000 of
income that she had to give Emma? No, because tax year three is "over";
Claire claimed entitlement to all of the royalties she received in year three, so
she had to include all of the royalties on her year three return.288 Is Claire
then left paying $12,000 of tax on $30,000 of "income" that she did not get
to keep? No, she can, in effect, recover the $12,000 of tax she paid in year
three by taking a tax deduction in year four for the $30,000 she has to pay
Emma in year four.289 If Claire pays tax in year four at a 40% rate, the
$30,000 deduction in year four will save her $12,000 of tax in year four. Put
another way, using Yogi's words, year three is not "over 'til it's over" in
year four.
What if Claire pays tax at only a 30% rate in year four? She paid $12,000
of tax (at a 40% tax rate) on the $30,000 of year three royalties that she has
to give Emma, but a $30,000 deduction in year four will save her only
$9,000 of tax in year four ($30,000 deduction multiplied by her 30% tax
rate). Although Claire cannot amend her year three return because year three
is "over," a special rule permits her to do the next best thing. Instead of tak-
ing a $30,000 deduction in year four, which would save her $9,000 in tax,
she can simply reduce her year four tax bill by the $12,000 in tax she paid in
year three on the $30,000 of royalties that she has to give Emma.29 Again,
year three is not "over 'til it's over" in year four.
Legal Significance:
Although our federal income tax system requires the use of an annual ac-
counting period, a tax year that appears to be "over" is sometimes not "over"
until a transaction reported in that year is completed in a later tax year.
Topic: Gender Bias in the Tax Code
Berraism: "[She] can run anytime [she] wants. I'm giving [her] the red
light."29
'" See North American Oil Consol. v. Bumet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
, See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951); I.R.C. § 1341 (West 1986 & West Supp. 1996).
'" I.R.C. § 1341.
9 As Yankee manager, commenting on the acquisition of Rickey Henderson. DICKSON, supra note 10,
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Legal Application:
This Berraism captures the way in which laws can send mixed messages.
For example, federal law prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
gender,292 but the tax code provides numerous incentives for a secondary
wage earner (the spouse with lower earnings, typically the wife293) to work
for no pay in the home instead of working in a paying job outside the home,
especially if the couple has children. 4
In one of his articles on gender bias in the tax code, Professor McCaffery
includes several examples to illustrate the "red light" the tax code gives sec-
ondary wage earners who are considering working for pay. 5 In one of
these examples, the "Uppers" (named for being an upper income earning
couple) are trying to decide whether Ms. Upper should take a job that pays
$30,000 a year or stay home and take care of their child. Mr. Upper earns
$60,000 a year.296 After taking into account the expenses that the Uppers
will incur to enable Ms. Upper to work (e.g., the costs of child care) and
various tax provisions, McCaffery concludes that Ms. Upper's $30,000 a year
job will actually net the family just $5,250!... On the other hand, if Mr.
Upper could figure out how to increase his pay by $30,000 (e.g., by billing a
few hundred extra hours at a law firm), the Uppers would net $16,625 !29
McCaffery argues that the tax code thus discourages secondary wage earners
from working outside the home2. and, because secondary wage earners are
at 42.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
-" Edward J. MeCaffery, Taration and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the
Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 985 (1993).
' Id. at 988. Professor McCaffery discusses five factors that encourage secondary wage earners to
work in the home for no pay instead of working outside the home for pay: (I) taxing the income of the sec-
ondary wage earner at a rate at least equal to the highest tax rate applicable to the income of the primary
wage earner; (2) requiring each wage earner to pay Social Security tax, but partially aggregating the Social
Security benefits of the spouses; (3) excluding from the income tax base the imputed income of a spouse
who works in the home for no pay; (4) limiting the credit or exclusion for the costs of child care that enable
the secondary wage earner to work outside the home; and (5) the tax rules governing noncash employee
fringe benefits (rules that encourage employers to furnish noncash fringe benefits to employees despite the
fact that many secondary wage earners would prefer cash wages to the noncash fringe benefits). Id. at 988-
1013.
I' d. at 1014-29.
I. at 1025.
Id. at 1026-27.
" Id. at 1027.
Id.
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disproportionately women, the tax code marginalizes women in the
workplace.3"'
Legal Significance:
Although a secondary wage earner can work outside the home for pay
"anytime [s]he wants," the tax code gives her a "red light," encouraging her
to stay at home and care for the children.
Topic: Tax Policy
Berraism: Ordering a drink on a hot day, Berra said, "Hey, Nick, get me a
diet Tab. 30'
Legal Application:
"Diet" seems redundant because "Tab" is a brand of diet soda. However,
Yogi may just have been thinking expansively; he may have assumed that it
would be possible for Nick to serve him a Tab that was not a "diet" Tab (for
example, a Tab in an ice cream float), in which case his seemingly redundant
request makes perfect sense.
Yogi's request is reminiscent of one of the views expressed in a jurispru-
dential debate in the tax policy literature: how do we determine whether a
tax system is equitable? Traditionally, tax policy commentators have asserted
that a tax proposal is equitable if it satisfies both the norms of "horizontal
equity" and "vertical equity."3 2 The horizontal equity norm stands for the
proposition that equally situated taxpayers (taxpayers with equal economic
income) should be treated equally.03 The vertical equity norm stands for the
proposition that we should apply an appropriate pattern for differentiating
among taxpayers who are not equally situated (taxpayers with different
amounts of economic income).3"
"' id. at 987.
' PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
" Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990).
'n' Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equitw The MusgravelKaplow Ex-
change, I FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993).
'I d. Tax policymakers usually assume that money has declining marginal utility, so they take the
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Professor Kaplow has argued that the horizontal equity norm should not be
considered a norm independent of the vertical equity norm, in part because
any appropriate pattern of differentiating between unequals must treat equals
consistently, so the horizontal equity norm is subsumed within the vertical
equity norm." Professor Musgrave however, maintains that horizontal equi-
ty is an independent norm; in his view, considering horizontal equity in real
world settings (as opposed to ideal "first best" settings) can tell us something
that a vertical equity inquiry does not.3"6
Legal Significance:
Professor Kaplow, taking the position that the horizontal equity norm is
subsumed within the vertical equity norm, would simply advise Congress to
give us a tax code that satisfies the vertical equity norm. On the other hand,
Professor Musgrave would advise Congress to give us a tax code that satisfies
the horizontal equity norm and the vertical equity norm, just as Yogi asked
Nick for a "diet Tab."
position that a progressive income tax (with tax rates increasing as income increases) is the most appropriate
pattern for differentiating between taxpayers with different amounts of income. See. e.g., Louis Kaplow,
Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search ofa Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139, 143, 147 (1989). However.
Professors McDaniel and Repetti have cautioned that the vertical equity norm is meaningful only if infused
with a specific theory of distributive justice. McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 303. at 611. For a discussion
of theories ofjustice that could provide an appropriate standard for differentiating between unequally situat-
ed taxpayers, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas D. Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taration, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1915 (1987).
"' Kaplow, supra note 304; Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, I FLA. TAX REV. 191
(1992). Professors Griffith, McDaniel, and Repetti agree with Professor Kaplow that horizontal equity should
not be treated as an independent norm. Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norns" Be Abandoned? Rethink-
ing Tar Policy Analysis and the Taxation ofPersonal Injui, Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. REV. Il15, 1155-59;
McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 303, at 613.
' Musgrave, supra note 302; Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equit)y A Further Note, I FLA. TAX
REV. 354 (1993). Although a number of commentators have sided with Professor Kaplow and rejected the
horizontal equity norm, other commentators have continued to apply it. See, e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE &
JON M. BAKUA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES
TO REFORM 20-21 (1994) ("One beauty of the horizontal equity principle is its lack of conflict with other
principles .... You and I may disagree on how progressive we would like government to be, but we can
still agree that. whatever the level of progressivity. two persons in equal circumstances should be treated
equally under the law.").
[Vol. 46
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF YOGI BERRA
Topic: Inflation Adjustments for Rate Brackets
Berraism: "A nickel ain't worth a dime any more."307
Legal Application:
Yogi understood the effects of inflation. Assuming a modest annual infla-
tion rate, a dime in 1955 (the year in which Yogi was elected the American
League's Most Valuable Player0 .) bought less than a nickel in 1925 (the
year in which Yogi was born)." 9
Simplifying somewhat, a taxpayer's federal income tax liability for a given
tax year equals the taxpayer's taxable income for the year, multiplied by the
tax rates that apply to that income, less any tax withheld during the year."'
The income tax rates for individuals are set forth in § I of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. The rates are progressive, meaning that the rate of tax increases
as the taxpayer's income increases. For example, an individual taxpayer with
$24,650 of taxable income pays tax at a 15% rate and owes $3,697.50 of
tax.3"' If that taxpayer's taxable income increases to $34,650, the taxpayer
pays tax at a 15% rate on the first $24,650 of income ($3,697.50 of tax) and
a 28% rate on the next $10,000 of income ($2,800 of tax), for total tax due
of $6,497.50 ($3,697.50 plus $2,800).312
If a taxpayer's wages are increased annually just to keep up with inflation,
the taxpayer's spending power does not increase but her taxable income does.
Unless the tax rate brackets in § I are adjusted for inflation, the increase in
taxable income may drive the taxpayer into a higher rate bracket and increase
the tax rate on that income. This increase in tax rate without any correspond-
ing increase in spending power is sometimes referred to as "bracket creep."
Yogi comprehended the effects of inflation many years before Congress
figured it out. Congress waited until 1981 to add § l(f) to the Internal Reve-
.' DICKSON, supra note 10. at 41.
"a SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 6, at 302-05.
" THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 785.
"' I.R.C. §§ 1, 31 (West 1986 & West Supp. 1996).
I" i.R.C. § 1(c); Rev. Proc. 96-59, 1996-53 I.R.B. I (Dec. 30, 1996).
"" I.R.C. § I(c); Rev. Proc. 96-59, 1996-53 I.R.B. I.
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nue Code."3 Section 1(f) increases the minimum and maximum dollar
amounts in each rate bracket in § I to account for inflation and to eliminate
bracket creep.
Legal Significance:
Increases in a taxpayer's taxable income that are attributable to inflation do
not increase the taxpayer's spending power and should not drive the taxpayer
into a higher tax rate bracket.
Topic: Federal Tax Policy and Legislation
Berraism: "If you don't know where you're going, you might end up some-
where else."3 '4
or
"Foresight.is always better, afterward."3 '5
Legal Application:
In the summer of 1990, President George Bush and the Democrat-con-
trolled Congress had reached an impasse in budget negotiations.3"6 There
existed a strong sentiment in the country that the national priority was to
reduce the deficit and balance the budget."7 It became increasingly apparent
to all parties involved in the negotiations that, in spite of President Bush's
1988 campaign promise,3"' there would have to be some form of tax in-
"' Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
314 Tirheimer v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2307 (1992). Variations on this theme are found
elsewhere in the literature. See. e.g., DICKSON, supra note 10, at 45 ("You've got to be very careful ifyou
don't know where you're going, because you might not get there.").
"' Quoted by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Gerbers. Ltd. v. Wells Counly Drainage Bd., 608
N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
"' In a special report prepared for Tax Analysts, Joel S. Newman traces the history of the enactment
of the luxury tax, chronicling the responses of the affected industry groups as directed to Congress. the IRS.
and the marketplace. Joel S. Newman, !Er Lux. 55 TAX NOTES 253 (Apr. 13, 1992).
'" Sheldon Pollack, in his retrospective on the enactment of the luxury tax, acknowledged that "[b]y
1990. with the economy beginning to slide into recession, the federal deficit became an ever greater con-
cem." Sheldon D. Pollack, Farewell to Tar Reform: The 1993 Tax Act in Historical Perspective, 64 TAX
NOTES 1081, 1085 (Aug. 22, 1994).
"' The "read my lips, no new taxes" pledge became an increasingly difficult one for President Bush to
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crease in order to raise the necessary revenue.3"9 Toward that end, at a se-
cret budget "summit" held at Andrews Air Force Base, a proposal calling for
a new tax on luxury items32 was agreed upon. This so-called "luxury tax"
was aimed at raising revenue from those deemed most able to pay, by impos-
ing a ten percent tax on the purchase of luxury items such as cars, yachts,
private planes, jewelry, and furs.32' It was estimated that the luxury tax
would raise $1.5 billion in revenue over a five-year period.3"
The luxury tax was viewed by a number of the summiteers,323 many of
whom would be facing reelection in the fall, as a way of raising revenue
from the "rich" without further burdening the middle class and working
poor.324 Moreover, this tax increase could be accomplished without necessi-
keep. Tom Redbum & William J. Eaton, Bush, Top Lawmakers Reach Agreement on Deficit Package, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. I, 1990, at Al ("At first, shortly after the talks started, Bush dismayed conservative Republicans
when he reneged on his famous 'no new taxes' campaign pledge by acknowledging, at Democratic insis-
tence, that revenue increases would have to be part of any deficit-cutting agreement.").
"' Lane Davenport, Bush Acknowledges Need for New Taxes. 48 TAX NOTES 7 (July 2, 1990) (cov-
erage of June 26, 1990, announcement). See also Redbum & Eaton, supra note 318.
" A luxury is "something that some people think other people should do without." Norman B. Ture,
Social Policy and Excise Tares, 40 TAX NOTES 737, 739 (Aug. 15, 1988) (quoting Henry C. Simons).
' Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11.211, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4000-4007). The Act imposed new taxeson certain luxury items. Sections 4001,
4002, 4003, 4006, and 4007 of the Internal Revenue Code imposed taxes on sales of passenger vehicles with
a price exceeding $30,000, boats with a price exceeding $100,000, aircraft with a price exceeding $250,000,
and furs and jewelry with a price exceeding $10,000. Each tax was equal to 10% of the amount by which
the sales price exceeded the threshold amount. Furthermore, each tax was imposed upon the first retail sale
of a taxable article and was to be paid by the seller of the taxable article.
'- The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the entire set of luxury taxes would raise $1.5
billion over five years, including $300 million in 1991 alone. See F. R. Nagle, Can the U.S. Afford the Lux-
ur)
, 
Tax?. 52 TAX NOTEs 878 (Aug. 19, 1991).
"u This group, dubbed the "super summit" on Capitol Hill, consisted of Speaker of the House Thomas
S. Foley, D-Wash., House Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo., House Minority Leader Bob
Michel, R-1Il., Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, D-Maine, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole,
R-Kans.. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, Budget Director Richard G. Darman, and White House
Chief of Staff John Sununu. Tim Gray, Summit Week in Review: Negotiators T3y 'Super Summit" to Bridge
Tar and Spending Gaps. 48 TAX NOTES 1583 (Sept. 24, 1990).
'' Well into 1991, many Democrats still supported the measure and believed that the luxury tax could
be repealed only if the Republicans were willing to soak the rich some other way, preferably through higher
income tax rates. Among those who continued to view the luxury tax as a counterweight to the increase in
the "middle class" sin taxes was Rep. Gephardt, who, reiterating a theme repeatedly raised in the summit
negotiations, said:
So, I say to my Republican colleagues, if you must repeal the luxury tax, let's replace it with a
millionaire's surtax. Tridkle down shouldn't leave the middle class holding the bag.
137 CONG. REC. H4225 (daily ed. June II, 1991) (statement of Rep. Gephardt).
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tating an increase in the marginal rates, deemed to be a politically unpalatable
alternative.3
Unfortunately for all involved, the luxury tax did not have the intended
consequences. 2 6 Instead of raising revenue from the rich, the net effect of
the luxury tax was to further cripple domestic manufacturing industries al-
ready reeling from the impact of a recession and to put thousands of blue-
collar tradespeople on the unemployment rolls. 27 Ultimately, estimates
placed the cost of the luxury tax to the government at $20 million in its first
year, or roughly a cost of $6 in lost tax revenue and unemployment benefits
for every $1 of tax collected. 28
Almost as soon as the provision became law, calls for its repeal were being
heard from industry representatives, academics, and members of both political
parties.3 29 In 1993, after devastating many of the "luxury" industries indi-
rectly targeted by these provisions and permanently eliminating thousands of
jobs from the economy, the tax was repealed.3
See generally Newman. supra note 316.
" Shortly after the enactment of the tax, Representative Byron L. Dorgan, Democrat of North Dakota
and a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, who participated in the budget negotiations, reluc-
tantly defended the tax:
It is safe to say nobody likes any tax any more. We all know that. But we had to construct some
revenues and one item on a long list was a luxury tax.
Mr. Dorgan conceded that the closed budget process did not permit a study of the consequences of
any revenue-raising plan. The luxury tax, like most other elements of the package, "was plugged in the mid-
dle of the process without hearings," he said. "We do not have much information on what the compliance
costs will be." Philip Shabecoff, New Lurty Tax May Cost More Than It Can Bring In. N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1991, at Dl.
"" Diane Culbertson, Shooting at the Rich but Hitting the Workers, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 1991, at
12A; Linda M. Harington, Lux- y Tar on Boats Sinks Jobs, U.S. Revenue, Critics Sary CHI. TRIB., June 13,
1991, at CI; David Treadwell, Luxury Tax May Scuttle Boat Makers. Builders Blame the New Levyfor Dec-
imating Sales and Forcing the Loss of 19.000 Jobs, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at A5. See also Miscella-
neous Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong.
389-95 (1991) (prepared statement of Dennis Zimmerman); The Cost of Tax-Related Job Loss Versus Pro-
jected Revenue Gain from Luxury Taxes in Fiscal 1991 (prepared by Republican staff of the Joint Economic
Committee, July 1991). But see Michael Kinsley, Phoney Case Against the Luxury Tax, WASH. POST, Oct.
18, 1991, at A21, reprinted in THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 1991, at 4.
The Cost of Tar-Related Job Loss Versus Projected Revenue Gain fiom Luxury Taxes in Fiscal
1991, supra note 327. While this may not be the most objective assessment of the impact of the luxury tax,
it does provide an analytical framework which finds support elsewhere in the literature. See generally
Newman. supra note 316. See also Karen Koff, News Briefi: Republicans Release Luxur. Tax Stud; Call
For Repeal. 52 TAx NOTES 392 (July 22, 1991).
"" See generally Nagle, supra note 322.
'" The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,161, 107 Stat. 312
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Legal Significance:
There is a place for Yogi in Congress.33' As the enactment and subse-
quent repeal of the "luxury tax" demonstrates, congressional leaders and their
executive branch counterparts clearly did not know where they were going
when they enacted the luxury tax in 1990. Consequently, Congress did not
wind up where it wanted to be, as the immediate torrent of criticism proved.
But then, foresight is always better-afterward.332
10. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Topic: Habeas Corpus
Berraism: On the shadows in left field at Yankee Stadium in the fall: "It
gets late early out there." '333
Legal Significance:
Yogi's maxim certainly is shared now by every prisoner waiting for his
turn at bat before the federal courts on a habeas corpus petition. Under the
new habeas corpus reform law, prisoners have only one year after ending
(1993), repealed the luxury taxes on aircraft, boats, furs, and jewelry effective for sales or uses occurring
after December 31, 1992. The demand for luxury items such as jewelry, furs, yachts, and private planes
proved to be far more inelastic than the summitteers imagined it to be. See comments of Rep. Dorgan in
Shabecoff, supra note 326. See also Pollack, supra note 317.
"' Yogi has also become an established figure in tax law. For an example of Yogi's prior appearance
in the literature, see Joseph V. Sliskovich. More on the Schneppet-Leimberg Joint Purchase, 33 TAX NOTES
1071 (Dec. 15. 1986).
" For a particularly appropriate application of this Berraism in the context of the luxury tax fiasco,
consider the statement of a former summiteer who said:
Fundamental reform almost always runs the risk of making things worse.
- Dan Rostenkowski, chairman, House Ways and Means Committee (1993)
Quoted in Seldon D. Pollack, Prepared Testimony Before the Senate Finance Comm., May 18, 1995, at 18
available in 1995 WL 306766.
Apparently, someone in Congress knew where he was going.
.". BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6. at 150; BERRA, supra note 18. at II; DICKSON, supra note
10. at 43; LEDERER. supra note 18, at 134; PEPE, suprt note 8, at 185.
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their appeals to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Once their
time is up, they're "out-of-there. 334
Topic: Search and Seizure
Berraism: When asked why he thought he would be a good manager, Yogi
responded: "You observe a lot by watching." '335
Legal Application:
In People v. Triggs,336 three Los Angeles police officers were on plain-
clothes patrol at a park. The officers suspected that illegal sexual activity was
occurring in a restroom at the park and went into the "plumbing access area"
of the park's restroom building. This area gave the officers access to plumb-
ing going to both the men's and women's restrooms and also provided a
vantage point from which the officers could observe activities in both
restrooms. The officers were able to observe the sexual activities from this
plumbing access area. The defendant claimed that this evidence should have
been suppressed because it was the result of an illegal search. The California
"4 The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1996). provides in
part:
(d)(1) A I-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from
the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review:
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action:
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Su-
preme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(d)(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other col-
lateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
"' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 149; BERRA, supra note 18, at 7: DICKSON, supra note
10, at 45: LEDERER, supra note 18, at 132; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
"' 506 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1973).
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Supreme Court agreed, saying that the defendant's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the restroom had been invaded.337
Legal Significance:
The Los Angeles police proved Yogi's point that "[y]ou observe a lot by
watching." But in this case, the California Supreme Court held that the police
should not have been watching.
Topic: Eyewitness Identification
Berraism: On his recognizability: "Most everybody knows me by my
face. 33t
Legal Application:
This Berraism expresses the problems inherent in the use of eyewitness
identification in criminal trials. Like Yogi, most of us are influenced by the
power of recognition. Thus, eyewitness identification is a potent type of evi-
dence at trial. "In cases where an eyewitness selects someone from a lineup
and then testifies that this is the person who committed the offense in ques-
tion, belief of the eyewitness is tantamount to believing that the defendant is
guilty." '339 Juries attach great weight to the testimony of the witness who
points a trembling, identifying finger at the defendant while stating, "I'll
never forget that face."34
There is, however, significant research showing that eyewitness identifica-
tion is not only fallible but is, in fact, less reliable than other types of evi-
dence.34' The Supreme Court itself has wrestled with the problem of eyewit-
" Id. at 235, 237.
"' PEPE, supra note 8. at 154.
" Gary L. Wells, Scientific Stud. of Witness Menoly: Implications for Public and Legal Policy I
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 726, 728 (1995).
ELIZABETH F. LomTUs, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979).
"' "Studies of proven cases of wrongful conviction indicate that about 3% are attributable to 'frame
ups.' 8% to coerced confessions, and 52% to false identifications." Id. See also Peter J. Cohen, How Shall
They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyew'itness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV.
237 (1996); James P. Murphy, An Evaluation of the Arguments Against the Use of Erpert Testinony on
Ey'ewitness Identification, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 21, 48 (1987) (warning that "eyewitness testimony, not
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ness identification, expressing discomfort with its associated problems3 42 and
finding a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all pretrial identification pa-
rades,143 only to later limit this right to those confrontations between the
witness and the accused that occurred prior to indictment or arraignment.3
Topic: Harmless Error
Berraism: On the Yankees losing the 1960 World Series to the Pirates: "We
made too many wrong mistakes. 345
Legal Application #1:
In Chapman v. California,346 the Supreme Court recognized that errors
committed by a trial judge in a criminal case can be categorized as harmful
(those that require reversal) or harmless (those that can be ignored on appel-
late review).347 The court explained that harmless error rules "serve a very
useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors
or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of
the trial. 348
The Court in Chapman merely reiterated what Yogi had observed seven
years earlier. In the course of a ball game, or series of ball games, errors are
inevitably made. These errors run the gamut from missing a steal sign, to
overthrowing first base, to hanging a curve ball over the middle of the plate,
sufficiently understood by the jury, is dangerous evidence which may easily result in miscarriages of jus-
tice"); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 975-88 (1977) (arguing that eyewitness testimony is necessarily unreli-
able because "perception ... is a constructive process by which people consciously and unconsciously use
decisional strategies to attend selectively to only a minimal number of environmental stimuli").
'2 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries of eyewitness identification
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.").
.41 Id. at 236-37.
." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (refusing to extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule
to identification testimony based upon a police station show-up that took place before formal charges had
been filed). Kirby effectively eviscerates the right since the investigating officer can avoid the involvement
of defense counsel simply by carrying out the identification procedure prior to indictment.
" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6. at 151; BERRA, supra note 18. at 8; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 44; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
' /d. at 21-22.
"' Id. at 22.
[Vol. 46
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF YOGI BERRA
resulting in a game-winning home run. Some of these mistakes have no effect
on the outcome of the game, while others are outcome determinative. This
latter class of mistakes, denominated by Yogi as "wrong mistakes," is clearly
distinguishable from the former category of "harmless errors."
Legal Application #2:
As Yogi aptly noted, only mistakes that matter, matter.349 Courts and
scholars have spilled veritable oceans of ink over the problem of harmless er-
ror.35 Perhaps most famous, but nevertheless typical, is Justice Traynor's
seminal essay which introduced the problem in the following terms:
Errors are the insects in the world of law, travelling through it in
swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession.... The well-being
of the law encompasses a tolerance for harmless errors adrift in an im-
perfect world .... So an inquiry into what makes an error harmless,
though one of philosophical tenor, is also an intensely practical inquiry
into the health and sanitation of the law. 35'
Yogi certainly said it more succinctly.
Topic: Perjury
Berraism: Disputing the veracity of many of the Berraisms: "I really didn't
say everything I said.
3 52
'" The rules of baseball require that harm result before a player be charged with an error. See Errors,
Rules 10.13, 10.14. in 1996 OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 213, at 90-93.
"' Compare Crease v. Barrett, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835), with Doe v. Tyler, 168 Eng. Rep. 1353
(Ex. 1835). For more modem discussions, see ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR
(1970); Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human. But Not Alwai's Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tol-
erated?. 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995); Craig Goldblatt. Harmless Error as Constitutional Common Law:
Congress's Power to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 985 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree,
Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105
HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991).
"' TRAYNOR, supra note 350, at Foreword.
'" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 151; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
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Legal Application:
Courts have narrowly construed the definition of perjury and put the bur-
den on the questioner to pin down the witness. "Under the pressures and
tensions of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses
to give answers that are not entirely responsive. Sometimes the witness does
not understand the question, or may in an excess of caution or apprehension
read too much or too little into it .... It is the responsibility of the lawyer to
probe; testimonial interrogation, and cross-examination in particular, is a
probing, prying, pressing form of inquiry." '353 The Court noted that it is en-
tirely proper for a wily witness to derail an attorney as long as the witness
speaks the literal truth.3"
In addition, the courts have emphasized the importance of the context in
which a statement is made in determining whether a statement is perjurious.
"The practice of lifting statements uttered by a witness out of context can
serve no useful purpose in advancing the truth-seeking role of the perjury
statutes." '355 Consequently, courts will consider whether the terms used in
the question were clear and whether the question called for a discrete answer.
Legal Significance:
The courts concur with Yogi's insight into the difficulty of determining
whether a statement was, in fact, made. Without knowing the context and the
exact question, it is impossible to determine in retrospect what a witness (or
Yogi) really said or meant.
Topic: Trial Tactics
Berraism: Why the Yankees lost the 1960 World Series to the Pittsburgh
Pirates: "We made too many wrong mistakes. 356
" Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973).
"I ld. at 360.
" United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1985).
" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS. supra note 6, at 151; BERRA. supra note 18, at 8, DICKSON, supra note
10, at 44: PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
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Legal Significance:
See "Trial of the Century," People v. O.J. Simpson.357
11. IMMIGRATION LAW
Topic: The Concept of "Entry": Fact and Fiction
Berraism: As Yankee manager on the acquisition of Rickey Henderson: "He
can run anytime he wants. I'm giving him the red light." '358
Legal Application:
Immigration law is full of paradoxes. One of the most glaring paradoxes is
that an alien who tries to come into the United States legally has fewer rights
than an alien who enters the country illegally.
Section 236(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states that
"Every alien.., who may not appear to the examining immigration officer at
the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be
detained35 for further inquiry to be conducted by a special inquiry offi-
cer."'3" This is known as an "exclusion hearing." Therein, aliens have only
the rights given to them by the statute and do not enjoy any constitutional
rights. However, strange as it may sound, aliens who have managed to enter
the United States illegally (that is, crossed into the territorial limits by inten-
tionally e,'ading the nearest inspection point and being free from restraint) are
placed in "deportation" proceedings and are entitled to constitutional
protections.
" L.A. Super. Ct. (No. BA09721 I) (1994).
.' DICKSON, supra note 10, at 42.
"' There is no statutory provision for aliens detained following exclusion hearings. However, the au-
thority of the Attorney General to detain excluded aliens for an indefinite period has been well established.
Gisbert v. United States Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437,1442 (5th Cir.), modified sub nona., United States
v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1993). On the other hand, aliens detained after an order of deportation
must generally be released after six months if the removal cannot be accomplished by that time. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1997) (INA, § 242(c)).
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1994).
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The United States Supreme Court recognized this anomaly in 1953 when in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei36' the Court said, "It is true that
aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be ex-
pelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law,... [b]ut an alien on the threshold of
initial entry stands on a different footing. ."... 3 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reiterated this anomaly in 1984 when it declared that
"[a]liens seeking admission to the United States therefore have no constitu-
tional rights with regard to their applications and must be content to accept
whatever statutory rights and privileges they are granted by Congress.""36
Legal Significance:
If our Supreme Court can sanction a paradox, then Yogi can have his say-
ing.
Topic: Aliens and the Fourth Amendment
Berraism: Yogi on his recognizability: "Most everybody knows me by my
face."
364
Legal Application:
This Berraism relates to the danger of judging by appearances. The danger
is particularly present in the area of immigration law, in which people's
Fourth Amendment rights tend to be violated merely because of their appear-
ance.
Section 287(a)(1) of the INA authorizes any officer or employee of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) to "interrogate any alien or person
believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the United
States.'365 There is no geographical limitation to this authority, and the
Government has contended that, at least in areas adjacent to the Mexican
" ' 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (citations omitted).
'~Id.
Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (1 Ith Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
u4 PEPE, supra note 8, at 188.
u, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(I) (1994).
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border, a person's apparent ancestry alone justifies the assumption that he or
she is an alien and satisfies the requirement of the statute.366 However, in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,367 a case in which officers relied solely up-
on respondent's Mexican ancestry to justify stopping his car, the Supreme
Court said:
We cannot conclude that this furnished reasonable grounds to believe
that the three occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a
fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illuminated by head-
lights. Even if they saw enough to think that the occupants were of
Mexican descent, this factor alone would justify neither a reasonable
belief that they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car con-
cealed other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers of
native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics
identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a relative-
ly small proportion of them are aliens.3"
Legal Significance:
Fame can allow someone to be "recognized" by his or her face, but that is
no claim to "know" someone. In the field of immigration, "knowing by a
face" leads to discrimination.
Topic: Admission of Aliens into the United States
Berraism: "You've got to be very careful if you don't know where you're
going, because you might not get there."369
Legal Application:
Aliens coming to the United States who have had the foresight to first
obtain a visa from the United States consul in their home country may be
very surprised when, upon arriving in the United States, they are not admitted
into the country.
', See. e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886 (1975).
'7 422 U.S. 873.
It. at 886 (emphasis added).
' DICKSON. supra note 10, at 45.
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The Supreme Court has made it very clear that admission into the United
States is a privilege and not a right. In United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy,"' while deciding whether an alien could be excluded without
a hearing upon a finding by the Attorney General that admission would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States, the Court said, "At the outset
we wish to point out that an alien who seeks admission to this country may
not do so under any claim of right. Admission of aliens to the United States
is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government."3 ' These
words are not simply a consequence of the time in which this opinion was
rendered (1950). In 1982, when deciding whether a lawful permanent resident
had any due process rights when returning to the United States, the Court re-
iterated: "This Court has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to
the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regard-
ing his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign
prerogative. 372
Legal Significance:
Although the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed the death of the
right versus privilege distinction in other areas of the law, 3 it is still alive
and well in immigration law. Thus, this Berraism, for better or worse, should
be kept in mind by all those coming to the United States, even if only for a
short visit.
12. EVIDENCE
Topic: Jury Instructions
Berraism: Once, when Joe Garagiola374 got lost on his way to Yogi's house
37. 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
,71 id.
.7 Landon v. Plasencia. 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
" See. e.g.. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254. 262 (1970); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
571 (1972).
374 Joe Garagiola and Yogi were boyhood friends in St. Louis. Garagiola played nine seasons in the
major leagues, split among the St. Louis Cardinals, Chicago Cubs, and Pittsburgh Pirates. Garagiola played
in the 1946 World Series as a member of the Cardinals. On playing in the World Series, Garagiola said,
"It's the same as any other ballgame you'll remember as long as you live." BERRA. supra note 18, at 84;
BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note I, at 1046; THE BEST OF BASEBALL, supra note 2, at 205; P-PE,
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and called for directions, Yogi instructed him, "You ain't too far,
just a couple of blocks. Only don't go that way, come this
way. 375
Legal Application:
In saying this, Yogi was making a wry observation about the nature of jury
instructions. The goal of the instructions is to inform the jury about the legal
standards by which it is to decide the case. However, too often the instruc-
tions are hopelessly complex. It is not simply that the law is itself complex,
but that courts have failed to frame intelligible instructions. It has been sug-
gested that a "fundamental reason for the difficulty that jurors have in com-
prehending jury instructions is the linguistic nature of the instructions them-
selves.' 3 76 And comprehensibility makes a difference. The authors of one
empirical study concluded that "there is a real world relationship between
levels of comprehensibility of legal instructions and jury deliberations and
trial outcomes.3 77
Anyone who has ever gone to law school will appreciate the precision and
clarity of the following jury instruction template:
If you find that defendant [X] was negligent and that such negligence
was a substantial factor in bringing about an injury to the plaintiff but
that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligent conduct of
defendant [Y], the defendant [X] is not relieved of liability for such
injury if:
I. At the time of such conduct defendant [X] realized or
reasonably should have realized that defendant [Y] might so
act; or
2. A reasonable person knowing the situation existing at
the time of the conduct of defendant [M] would not have
regarded it as highly extraordinary that defendant [Y] had so
acted; or
3. The conduct of defendant [Y] was not extraordinarily
negligent and was a normal consequence of the situation
created by defendant [X].
supra note 8, at 1-2.
"' PEPE, supra note 8, at 188.
"' Peter Meijes Tiersma. Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions. 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37. 46
(1993).
"' AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 17 (1982).
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[Extraordinary means unforeseeable, unpredictable, and statis-
tically extremely improbable.]37
If the law of "proximate cause" is a "tangle and a jungle, a palace of mirrors
and a maze. . . ," and the term "covers a multitude of sins [and] is a com-
plex term of highly uncertain meaning under which other rules, doctrines and
reasons lie buried . . . . ,"" then this jury instruction does not go far to
clarify it. Yet we assume that jury instructions are intelligible and are fol-
lowed by juries. As one author stated:
Fundamental to the Anglo-American process of trial by jury is the as-
sumption that after the presentation of evidence and argument by coun-
sel, the judge can instruct the jury on the applicable law, and the jury
will then apply those instructions to the facts of the case and return a
reasoned verdict. 80
If the proximate cause instruction noted above is any indication, then our
faith is misplaced.
Legal Significance:
We don't know whether Joe Garagiola found Yogi's home that day. Yogi
may or may not have believed he would. In either case, Yogi's instructions
illustrate that in everyday life, as in law, the help we receive in getting from
here to there often leaves us somewhere in between.
Topic: Use of Statistics
Berraism: Yogi's theory of baseball, a thinking person's game: "Ninety
percent of this game is half mental."38'
Meaning: In baseball, as in law, a balance of mental acuity as well as physi-
cal dexterity is essential for success. But occasionally, neither
mental acuity nor physical dexterity is apparent.
I' 1 COMMrrEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGEL-
ES COUNTY, CAL., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 3.79 (1994).
William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369, 369, 374 (1950).
Tiersma. supra note 376, at 39.
"' DICKSON, supra note 10, at 44; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
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Legal Application:
One might be tempted to apply the product rule to Yogi's equation and
abbreviate his formula to say baseball is forty-five percent mental (.90 x .50
= .45). However, that is saying something completely different from what
Yogi intended. He was absolutely correct to separate the proportion of the
game and the proportion of mental acuity, because they are not independent
variables. Which ninety percent of the game is half mental may depend on
the ballpark one is playing in, the team one is up against, and even the time
of day or night. Similarly, the brain power to be applied, whether it be half,
more than half, or less than half, will often turn on the same factors.
Judicial agreement with Yogi came in People v. Collins."2 The California
Supreme Court declared that the proportion of women who were blonde and
the proportion of women who wore ponytails could not be multiplied, be-
cause the independence of these two factors had not been established."'
Thus, a witness could not testify that, if one-third of women are blonde, and
one-tenth wear ponytails, then the probability of a woman being blonde with
a ponytail was one in thirty."l One could only say that ninety percent of the
women who wear ponytails are blonde one-third of the time."'5 One might
say that one-third of all women wear ponytails every tenth day if they are
blondes, but those are the kinds of statements that are likely to be challenged,
like "blondes have more fun."38
6
As the California Supreme Court declared, in a frequently quoted observa-
tion:
By subtracting the probability that C will occur in exactly one couple
from the probability that C will occur in at least one couple, one obtains
the probability that C will occur in more than one couple: [I- (I-Pr)N]-
[(N) x (Pr) x (I-Pr) N-i]. Dividing this difference by the probability that
C will occur in at least one couple (i.e., dividing the difference by [I -(1-
Pr)N] then yields the probability that C will occur more than once in a
group of N couples in which C occurs at least once."7
" 68 Cal. 2d 319 (1968).
j" Id. at 328.
W" Id.
" See, e.g.. Gentlemen Prefer Blondes. But see Dagwood and Blondie Meet Frankenstein; Abbott and
Costello Meet Frankenstein. Cf Dagwood and Blondie Meet Abbott and Costello.
"' Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 334.
1997]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Legal Significance:
Thus, it is far safer to say that ninety percent of blondes are half mental.
13. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Topic: Late Filing of Notice of Claim
Berraism: On the shadows in left field at Yankee Stadium in the fall: "It
gets late early out there."3 '
Legal Application:
One aspiring New York Yankee, Andre Robertson," 9 learned what Yogi
meant after an auto accident in New York in August 1983. In the early hours
of the morning, Robertson was driving with a college friend, Shenikwa Dawn
Nowlin.3 o As he headed south on the Henry Hudson Parkway, he started to
slow down as he approached a "reverse-S" curve.39' However, he could not
avoid smashing into the concrete barriers.392 His car flipped over and Rob-
ertson suffered neck and shoulder injuries.393 Nowlin suffered more serious
injuries and became a paraplegic.394
a BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; PEPE, supra note 8. at 187.
"x Robertson. who was the first African-American player to win a baseball scholarship to the Universi-
ty of Texas, was in his first full year playing shortstop for the Yankees and hitting .248 when the accident
occurred. Danny Robbins. Andre's Odyssey: Once a Promising Yankee. Robertson Toils in the Minors, Un-
willing to Give Up the Dream, NEWSDAY, July 24, 1989, at 87.
-I' Nowlin, described as "a 24-year old former ballerina and beauty queen from Dallas," was visiting
Robertson before entering her third year of law school. Nowlin v. City of New York, 582 N.Y.S.2d 669,
670 (App. Div. 1992), affid, 612 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1993). By 1992. she had finished law school and was
working as a city attorney in Dallas. Id. at 673. At age 14, she had been the youngest member of the Dance
Theater of Harlem. Mark Lowery. Er-Ballerina Awarded $14M, NEWSDAY, Dec. 22, 1990, at 7.
.' Nowlin. 582 N.Y.S.2d at 670-71.
Sid.
~"Id.
" Nowlin also sued Robertson because he was driving between 50 and 65 mph, exceeding the speed
limit of 35 mph. The jury apportioned liability 67% against the city and 33% against Robertson. Id.
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Nowlin sued the City of New York claiming misplacement of the signs
warning of the "reverse-S" curve and ultimately received a judgment for $7.5
million." 5  Robertson, however, received nothing.3" The reason for this
was that he failed to comply with New York Municipal Code Section 50-
e(l)(a) requiring a notice of claim to be filed against the City "within ninety
days after the claim arises." '397
This failure to file a timely notice of claim is not always fatal, because the
courts have discretion to allow late filing.398 However, Robertson delayed
too long. It was not until February 1986 that he produced a medical affidavit
supporting his application for a late filing.3 The majority of the court con-
cluded that the affidavit was insufficient, and Robertson was not allowed to
have his day in court because of his failure to comply with the ninety-day
rule." The shadows over this Yankee's case had grown too long for the
majority of the Appellate Division.4"' The decision was split three to
two. 2 The dissent would have allowed Robertson to file late, because the
City had actual knowledge of the case and sufficient information such that it
would not have been prejudiced in mounting a defense.4 3
Legal Significance:
Time requirements preclude even meritorious claims from being heard. Too
many lawyers and their clients find that it gets late early out there.
.. Id. at 672.
" Robertson returned to the Yankees in 1984 and was vying for the shortstop position during spring
training in 1985, when Yogi quipped, "Andre's looked good. What I wanted to do here is see what he can
do." Claire Smith, Yanks Will Wait a Little More Before Panicking, N. N.J. REC., Mar. 13, 1985, at D4.
Unfortunately, Robertson injured his knee in spring training and required arthroscopic surgery. After some
time in Columbus, he returned to New York, where he played third base for the Yankees and hit .328 in 50
games in 1985. He was released by the Yankees during the 1986 season, and by 1989, his career had virtu-
ally ended, as did his lawsuit against the City of New York. Robbins, supra note 389, at 87. In 1990, it was
reported that he was working in a steam generating plant in Texas. Lowery, supra note 390. at 7.
J' N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(l)(a) (McKinney 1986).
"' N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(5) (McKinney 1986). The courts must consider if the petitioner has a
reasonable excuse for delay and if the City has received actual notice of the claim and would not be preju-
diced in maintaining its defense. Robertson v. City of New York, 536 N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (App. Div. 1989),
aff'd, 543 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1989) (mem.).
' Id. at 71-72 (Cairo, J., dissenting).
4, Id. at 70-71.
"' Id.
' Id. at 71.
" Id. at 72-73 (Carro, J., dissenting).
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Topic: Collateral Estoppel
Berraism: Explaining the declining attendance at Kansas City Athletics
games: "If people don't want to come to the ballpark, nobody's
going to stop them." 4"
Legal Application:
Under principles of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, a party to a
lawsuit may generally litigate an issue only once. After the issue has been
litigated and decided, the party who lost on that issue is usually precluded
from litigating it again in a subsequent lawsuit. °5 Traditionally, such estop-
pel could be invoked only against someone who was a party to the former
suit. To collaterally estop someone who was not a party to the first suit
would arguably violate their due process rights to notice and to an opportuni-
ty to be heard before being deprived of their property.4"
For a time, the Supreme Court toyed with the idea that collateral estoppel
could be used against someone who was not a party to the prior lawsuit, pro-
vided they deliberately bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene in the
prior lawsuit.4 7 However, in Martin v. Wilks, °5 the Court held that, in
federal court, persons who choose not to come forward and intervene in an
action and who are not otherwise made parties to that action cannot later be
estopped from litigating issues that were decided in the first suit.4"9
• BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; DICKSON, supra note 10, at 43. LEDERER, supra note
18. at 134; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
" See. e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac. 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
4,* U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. See Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 671 (6th Cir.
1973) (holding that for a federal court to collaterally estop a nonparty would violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment).
"' Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968) (leaving open the
question whether a person "should be bound by the previous decision because, although technically a non-
party, he had purposefully bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene").
4, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989).
" M. at 761-62.
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Legal Significance:
The Supreme Court might have summarized its holding in Martin v. Wilks
by paraphrasing Yogi Berra: "If people don't want to come to [become a
party to a lawsuit], nobody's going to [e]stop them."
Topic: Pleading
Berraism: "When you come to the fork in the road, take it.i
4 °0
Legal Application:
A considerable part of the job of a lawyer is to make choices about strate-
gy based upon imperfect information. The ideal, of course, is to make the
bold, brilliant, and unanticipated choice. Thus, Robert Frost's advice about
what to do at a fork in the road is so often quoted as to become clich6. It
However, the better advice for most of us is to choose that which serves the
"' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; BERRA, supra note 18, at 7.
'" Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;
Then took the other, as just as fair,
And having perhaps the better claim,
Because it was grassy and wanted wear,
Though as for that, the passing there
Had wom them really about the same.
And both that morning equally lay
In leaves no step had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
I doubted if I should ever come back.
I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I -
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
Robert Frost, "The Road Not Taken."
THE POCKET BOOK OF ROBERT FROST'S POEMS 223 (Louis Untermeyer ed., 1971).
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client's immediate purposes and does not foreclose too many options in the
future. Thus, although Robert Frost's view is perhaps more familiar, Yogi's is
better advice: keep your options open and don't make false choices.
Drafting a complaint is one occasion where the law sides with Yogi. Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits pleading in the alterna-
tive. 12  Alternative pleading, especially subject to the requirements of Rule
11,413 is not a concept that is intuitively obvious to most, although Yogi had
no trouble with it. In McCormick v. Kopmann 4t4 the widow of a man killed
in a traffic accident involving a truck sued the truck driver as well as the
owners of the bar where her husband had been drinking prior to the accident.
In one count, the widow alleged that her husband had exercised due care and
that the truck driver had driven across the center line and collided with her
husband's car." In another count, the widow sought damages from the bar
owner under the state dram shop act and alleged that the bar had sold alco-
holic beverages to her husband which led to his inebriation and that "'as a
result of such intoxication' [he] drove his automobile 'in such a manner as
to cause a collision.... ,,416 Under Illinois law, to recover from the truck
driver, the widow had to establish that her husband was free of contributory
Rule 8(e)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically,
either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses .... A party may also state as
many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2). Rule 8(e)(2) admonishes lawyers, however, that "[a]ll statements shall be made
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule I I." Id.
'" Rule I I provides, in pertinent part:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading,
written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, -
(I) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un-
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifi-
cally so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery; ...
FED. R. CIV. P. I I(b).
4 161 N.E.2d 720 (11. Ct. App. 1959).
I d. at 724.
4t- Id.
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negligence." 7 Thus, the two counts were mutually exclusive; both allega-
tions could not be true.418
In upholding the denial of the truck driver's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint, the court held that alternative and inconsistent pleading is permissible
so that "complete justice [may be] accomplished in a single action," as long
as the pleader does not know which of the inconsistent allegations are true
and which are not.419 "Where ... the injured party is still living and able to
recollect the events surrounding the accident, pleading in the alternative may
not be justified, but where, as in the case at bar, the key witness is deceased,
pleading alternative sets of facts is often the only feasible way to pro-
ceed.
420
Legal Significance:
True professional skill, as Yogi recognized, is knowing when one must, for
strategic reasons, make a choice, and when, on the other hand, the best tactic
is to keep one's options open.
Topic: Summary Judgment
Berraism: "Anybody who can't tell the difference between a ball hitting
wood and a ball hitting concrete must be blind."
42
'
Meaning: Yogi's statement illustrates perfectly the Supreme Court's stan-
dards for rendering summary judgment in federal civil actions. A
blind umpire is akin to a jury that would find for a litigant even
though no reasonable person could find for that litigant on the
basis of the evidence presented. Of course, as always, Yogi's
"' Id. at 725.
This is why students find it difficult to square alternative pleading with Rule I l(b)(3)'s requirement
that allegations have evidentiary support. See supra note 413. This is an opportunity for law professors to
remind students that there is a world of difference between something's having evidentiary support and
something's being true.
41' McCormick, 161 N.E.2d at 726.
'20 Id. at 727-28.
'i DICKSON, supra note 10, at 41; PEPE, supra note 8, at 188. In an argument with an umpire who
ruled that a ball hit a concrete wall and was thus in play, Yogi said it hit a wooden barricade beyond the
wall and was thus a home run, quoted in SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 1990.
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statement is ironic in that one generally would expect the umpire
and the judge to be the analogous actors from an adjudicatory
standpoint. The double irony is that, as will be shown below,
judges may be as blind or deaf as umpires.
Legal Application:
In the famous trilogy of summary judgment cases decided in 1986, the
Supreme Court set out the modem standard for determining when summary
judgment should be granted by a district court.422 The purpose of the deci-
sions was to clarify how much evidence a plaintiff would need, in opposing a
motion for summary judgment, to defeat that motion and proceed to a jury.
Thus, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,4" the Court ruled that the defendant need
not disprove the plaintiffs case to be granted summary judgment.424 Rath-
er, upon a simple showing by the defendant that the plaintiff, after a fair
opportunity for discovery, lacks the evidence necessary to prove one or more
essential elements of its claim, the plaintiff must submit evidence in its sum-
mary judgment response on such elements to show that there is a genuine
issue of material fact.4
In the other two trilogy cases, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 426 and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,427 the Court set
forth the standards for determining when, after the plaintiff makes its submis-
sion, summary judgment should to be granted. In Anderson, the Court equat-
ed the granting of a motion for summary judgment with a motion for a post-
trial directed verdict.42 The Court found that the evidence submitted by the
opponent of the summary judgment motion must be viewed "through the
prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. ' '429 The Court reasoned that the
opponent should be entitled to a jury trial only if the evidence submitted
would be enough to permit a reasonable jury to find as a matter of law for
'., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
" 477 U.S. 317.
'' Id. at 322-23.
'' Id. at 322-24. See also FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e).
. 477 U.S. 242.
*- 475 U.S. 574.
., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
4" Id. at 254.
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the opponent after trial.43 The Court in Matsushita embellished on this
theme. The more implausible the theory underlying the opponent's claim, the
more evidence the opponent would need to rebut the more plausible inference
raised by the proponent of the motion."3 Again, there would be no point in
allowing the case to be tried by a jury when, as a matter of law, the opponent
of the motion lacked sufficient evidence to win.432
Legal Significance:
In the case of the disputed home run, Yogi wisely suggests two theories for
why summary judgment is appropriate for him. First, he appears to be argu-
ing that there is no credible evidence suggesting that the ball was not a home
run. Instead, given the differences in the "thud" that would be heard and in
the way the ball would carom off the different materials, a reasonable person
could only find that the ball hit wood, and therefore was a home run. The
umpire, in Yogi's view, lacked sufficient evidence that the ball hit concrete
to get to a jury. Second, Yogi is arguing that it was implausible that the ball
hit concrete. Given the thud and the way the ball caromed off the wall, the
only plausible explanation for what happened was that the batter had hit a
home run.
The irony, of course, is that Yogi was fighting with the judge. Indeed,
Yogi's statement demonstrates the trap for the unwary built into the Supreme
Court's approach for deciding summary judgment. In Anderson, the Court
noted that when looking at the opponent's evidence through the evidentiary
prism, the court should consider the quality and quantity of the evidence
submitted. 3 The district court is not allowed to weigh the evidence on a
motion for summary judgment. That, of course, is the function of the jury,
and the majority in Anderson dutifully pointed out that fact.434 As the dis-
sent feared,43 however, and as Yogi learned, this loose language can be
used by those visually or tonally impaired umpires to doom justice in the land
by depriving the good guys of the cheers they so richly deserve to hear,
thereby giving new meaning to the axiom that "justice is blind."
I ' . at 250-5 1.
' Matsushita, 477 U.S. at 587.
4'2 Id. at 587-88.
.. Andero,. 477 U.S. at 254.
- M. at 254-55.
4." Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Topic: Injunctions
Berraism: Asked by a player for the correct time, Berra responded: "Do you
mean now?" '436
or
Yogi asked sportscaster Jack Buck what time he would be arriving
at the hotel during a World Series. Buck answered "About 2
a.m.," to which Yogi responded: "Was that local time?" '437
or
Once while playing the game Twenty Questions, Yogi asked: "Is
he living?" Then, without thinking, Yogi asked, "Is he living
now?si
438
Legal Application:
The meaning of each of these three Berraisms is "be precise." The Su-
preme Court agreed with Yogi's admonition in International Longshore-
men's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n,'4 ' a case which discussed
specificity in an injunction." The district court had issued an injunction
which dealt with strikes along the Philadelphia waterfront. 44 Some union
members and officers were held in contempt for violating the injunction de-
spite their arguments that the injunction was vague and that they did not
know what acts constituted violations of the injunction."2 The Supreme
Court agreed with the union members, saying:
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was designed to
prevent precisely the sort of confusion with which this District Court
clouded its command. That rule provides: Every order granting an in-
"" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 152; BERRA, supra note 18, at 9, 17; LEDERER, supra
note 18, at 134; PEPE, supra note 8, at 187.
417 BERRA, supra note 18, at 17.
411 Id. at 9.
4" 389 U.S. 64 (1967).
'4' Id.
': Id. at 68.
" Id. at 72.
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junction ... shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable de-
tail ... the act or acts sought to be restrained ....
We do not deal here with a violation of a court order by one who fully
understands its meaning but chooses to ignore its mandate. We deal
instead with acts alleged to violate a decree that can only be described
as unintelligible. The most fundamental postulates of our legal order
forbid the imposition of a penalty for disobeying a command that defies
comprehension."3
Legal Significance:
Thus, Yogi's "Do you mean now?," "Was that local time?," and "Is he
living now?" are at the very heart of American justice: the law must be pre-
cise.
14. TRUSTS AND WILLS
Topic: Oral Promises; Trust Termination
Berraism: To wife Carmen about the movie The Magnificent Seven' star-
ring Steve McQueen: "He made that picture before he died."" 5
Legal Application:
Yogi seemingly distinguished acts having effect during one's lifetime from
acts not having effect until death. This distinction is important in the law.
Under the Statute of Frauds, certain contracts are unenforceable unless they
are in writing and signed by the party-to be charged. An example is a con-
tract that cannot be performed within the lifetime of the promisor.46
"' hi. at 74, 76.
... United Artists 1960.
"' BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 149; BERRA, supra note 18, at 6; DICKSON, supra note
10. at 42; PEPE, supra note 8, at 186.
'" California Civil Code § 1624 is a typical Statute of Frauds and states:
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Hagan v. McNary"7 applied the distinction with disastrous results to the
plaintiff. Therein, Mr. Kupper orally promised to pay plaintiff $7,000 if
plaintiff promised to take care of him for life."8 When Mr. Kupper died,
plaintiff made a claim against his estate based on the oral promise.449 The
court denied the claim because decedent's obligation to pay could not arise
during his lifetime, but only at his death.4 ' Thus, under the Statute of
Frauds, the oral promise was unenforceable.45'
The distinction is also illustrated in the area of trust termination. In
Rosenauer v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.,452 the settlor of a trust reserved
in herself the power to terminate the trust.453 This power, by the terms of
the trust, could be exercised anytime during the lifetime of the settlor by a
written instrument executed and delivered to the trustee.4" Subsequently,
the settlor executed a will in which she identified the trust, expressly termi-
nated it, and directed that the trust assets be delivered to her estate. 4"
The court found that the attempted termination of the trust was ineffec-
tive.456 A will is operative only upon death. Consequently, the will could
not constitute a written revocation during the settlor's (and the testator's)lifetime.45
The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent:
(e) An agreement which by it terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1996).
170 Cal. 141 (1915).
" Id. at 141.
4"Id.
I. ld. at 142-43.
I' d.
.. 30 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 300 (1973).
I' d.
I ld. at 301.
.' Id. at 301-02.
". Id. at 303-04.
.' Id. at 303.
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Legal Significance:
Without any legal training,45s Yogi grasped a concept that is critical in the
law: while most acts are effective during one's lifetime, others are not. The
failure to grasp that distinction can have dramatic consequences. Unfortu-
nately, the plaintiff in Hagan and the settlor in Rosenauer did not share the
same insight.
Topic: Punitive Damages; In Terrorem Clauses
Berraism: On the Mets' chances in the 1973 National League East pennant
race: "It's not over 'til it's over.
45 9
Legal Application:
Two recent California Court of Appeal decisions involving the estate of
Star Trek creator Gene Roddenberry contemplated the legal finality of death.
The first case, Roddenberry v. Roddenberry,461 involved the issue of wheth-
er punitive damages were properly awarded against Gene Roddenberry's loan-
out corporation, Norway, after his death.462  Eileen Roddenberry, Gene
4" Yogi never went to school beyond the eighth grade. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
"5 BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; BERRA, supra note 18, at 5; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 43; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
"', Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 44 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 634 (1996) [hereinafter Roddenberrjy 1] and
Estate of Eugene Wesley Roddenberry. unpublished Cal. App. B086718 (Sup. Ct. No. SPOO0741) (1996)
[hereinafter Roddenberry II].
'l 44 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 634.
Roddenberr I also involved the right of Eileen Roddenberry to postdivorce profits generated by the
Star Trek television series, movies, animations, and other Star Trek properties. As a part of the 1969 divorce
settlement agreement between Gene and Eileen, Eileen was allocated a one-half interest in all future profit
participation income from Star Trek to which Eileen and/or Gene were entitled. Id. at 641. It is interesting
to note that in 1969, at the time of the divorce, Star Trek had rated third in its time slot for each of its three
seasons, had just been cancelled by NBC, and had amassed a multimillion dollar production deficit. Id. Ef-
forts were made by Desilu, Star Trek's production company, to syndicate the series, and Desilu agreed that,
in the event of syndication, Norway was entitled to several types of income, including a set payment per
rerun and "profit participation" if reruns ever yielded profits according to the contractual formula. The con-
tract provided that Star Trek had to repay a large and growing production cost deficit before any syndication
profits would be payable to Norway. Id. By 1984, 15 years after the divorce, Star Trek had recouped its
production deficit, Norway began to receive "profit participation" payments, and Norway began making
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Roddenberry's first wife, claimed fraud in connection with Norway's and
Gene Roddenberry's handling of postdivorce payments to her, and she sought
punitive damages. 4
63
Pursuant to California Probate Code section 573(b),464 punitive damages
were not available against Gene Roddenberry's estate and were assessed only
against Norway. 5 On appeal, it was contended that the statutory postdeath
ban on punitive damages should be extended to Gene Roddenberry's loan-out
corporation.4' The court, reaffirming the distinction between the punitive
and exemplary aspects of a punitive/exemplary award, stated:
The proposition that such awards should be banned rests on a distinction
between the punitive and exemplary aspects of a punitive/exemplary
award. The distinction was recognized in Evans v. Gibson, which stated
that since "the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer
for his acts, accompanied by evil motive, and to deter him from the
commission of like wrongs in the future, the reason for such damages
ceases to exist with his death. It is true. that the infliction of punishment
serves as a deterrent to the commission of future wrongs by others as
well as by the wrongdoer, but punitive damages by way of example to
others should be imposed only on actual wrongdoers." Thus although the
exemplary function of a punitive/exemplary award can still be performed
by an award against the wrongdoer's estate, the exemplary function
without the punitive is not considered sufficient to justify the imposition
of punitive/exemplary damages. Hence the Legislature has outlawed such
awards. 7
Because Gene Roddenberry's death did not cause the legal termination of
Norway, the Court determined that the public policy motivations behind puni-
payments to Eileen. Id. at 642.
40 ki.
4i, CAL. PROB. CODE § 573(b) (West 1992). Effective January 1.' 1993, Probate Code § 573(b) was
repealed and replaced without substantive change by California Civil Procedure Code § 377.42, which like-
wise bars punitive damages against a decedent or estate. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.42 states:
In an action or proceeding against a decedent's personal representative or, to the extent provided
by statute, against the decedent's successor in interest, on a cause of action against the decedent,
all damages are recoverable that might have been recovered against the decedent had the decedent
lived except damages recoverable under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other punitive or ex-
emplary damages.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377A2 (West 1996).
, Roddenbeny 1, 44 Cal. App. 4th Supp., at 666.
I d.
4h7 N. at 666-67 (citation omitted).
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tive damages awards would be fulfilled by affirming the award of punitive
damages against Norway.s
The second case, Estate of Eugene Wesley Roddenbeny,469 involved
Dawn Roddenberry, the daughter of Eileen and Gene Roddenberry. When
Gene Roddenberry died in 1991, he left most of his estate in trust for his
second wife, Majel, and he provided that Dawn would receive $500,000 and
a share of the trust fund upon Majel's death.7 Gene Roddenberry's will
contained an in terrorem clause47 stating, "If any beneficiary under this
Will in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or attacks this Will or any
of its provisions, any share or interest in my estate given to that contesting
beneficiary under this Will is revoked and shall be disposed of in the same
manner as if that person had predeceased me leaving no issue. 4 72
Dawn contested the will on grounds that undue influence allegedly was
exercised by Majel upon Gene.473 Dawn also accused Majel of fraud.474
After two years of legal battles, Dawn voluntarily dismissed the will contest
on the day the matter had been set for trial, and Majel was awarded $334,568
in attorney's fees for her successful defense of the will contest.4
75
Majel subsequently filed an action seeking enforcement of the in terrorem
clause against Dawn.476 Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Irving Shimer
Id. at 667.
Roddenbeny II, unpublished Cal. App. B086718 (Sup. Ct. No. SP00741) (1996).
47. Id. at 3.
471 For a complete discussion of in terrorem clauses in California see, Andrew S. Garb, The In Terro-
rem Clause: Challenging California Wills, 6 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 259 (1979). Note that Andrew Garb of
Loeb and Loeb in Los Angeles represented Majel Roddenberry, executor of the Gene Roddenberry estate, in
her successful petition to enforce the in terrorem clause. Roddenber2y IL. Cal. App. B086718 at I.
"' Id. at 2.
411 Id. at 4.
474 Id.
41,1 Id. at 5. Dawn took approximately 16 depositions and conducted substantial written discovery. Id.
" Id. at 6. The appellate court commented in a footnote that Judge Shimer correctly applied the law
although he disagreed with it. The court referred to Judge Shimer's statement that extrinsic evidence that
Gene Roddenberry may not have wanted to disinherit his daughter regardless of her actions made the court
.angry ... towards the lawyers and accountants for what they did.... [Tihey took this man
in his declining years, this very talented writer, but not a lawyer, and put words at the end of his
pen on a page that he might have initialed if he was lucky. But that's all. I'm offended by it, but
that's the law. I read an article in the last week some place that the Burch case goes against the
national grain. There are more cases nationally which are rejecting no-contest forfeiture provi-
sions, which I applaud. It's a better world when you have that kind of thing, than what we have
in California. [But] You lose. The petition is granted.
1997]
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decided that the in terrorem clause applied, and the California Court of Ap-
peal affirmed the trial court decision to disinherit Dawn.4"' Thus, the voice
of Gene Roddenberry lived on through his will, and Dawn will not get the
$500,000 bequest, nor will she share in the millions she was entitled to upon
Majel's death. But this case is not yet over. Dawn may still seek a rehearing
by the California Supreme Court.
Legal Significance:
Although it is commonly believed that death is the final act in a person's
life, Yogi correctly recognized that "it's not over 'til it's over." Undoubted-
ly, Gene did not envision a courtroom as his final frontier.
FIELDS OTHER THAN LAW
Medicine and physics provide two examples of other disciplines to which
Yogi's wisdom relates. Since Yogi's wisdom is boundless, we hope that
these examples will motivate scholars in other fields.
15. MEDICINE478
Topic: Dedication Required in the Study and Practice of Medicine
Berraism: After Yogi's roommate, Yankee infielder and medical student
Bobby Brown, closed his medical book, Gray's Anatomy, Yogi,
who had just finished a comic book, asked: "How did yours come
out?
4 79
Id. at 6 n.3.
477 Id.
41, Our guest scholar who authored this medical entry is Kalman S. Eisenberg, M.D., an avid Yankees
fan and Assistant Clinical Professor of Orthopedic Surgery at the UCLA School of Medicine.
"' DICKSON, supra note 10. at 42; PEPE, supra note 8, at 187.
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Medical Application:
Once again, Yogi's words go beyond their literal meaning. The thrust of
his playful question was not to suggest that the conclusion of a comic book in
any way resembles the final chapter of the ponderous textbook, Gray's
Anatomy. Instead, Yogi was cleverly encouraging Bobby Brown to continue
his reading, knowing that a career in medicine demanded a dedication to the
unending acquisition of knowledge.
In addition to a memorable career in baseball (New York Yankees third
baseman (1946-54)), President of the Texas Rangers (1974), and President of
the American League (1984-94), Bobby Brown, perhaps spurred by Yogi's
encouragement, pursued a successful career as a cardiologist in Fort Worth,
Texas.480
Medical Significance:
As Yogi's comment implies, the practice of medicine is just that-an en-
deavor demanding the lifelong pursuit of knowledge and the perpetual honing
of one's skills.
16. PHYSICS 48'
Topics: Quantum Mechanics and Relativity
Background:
It was only in this century that the quirky and highly nonintuitive rules that
God apparently plays by, embodied in the laws of quantum mechanics and
relativity, have been uncovered by physicists such as Einstein,482
Jay K. Varma, Bobby' Brown. M.D.. JAMA, Nov. 2, 1994. available in 1994 WL 12885232; Ryan
Ver Berkmoes, Baseballs Modest Dr" Brown: Cardiologist. American League President. and Ex-Yankee
Slugger Bobby Brown, M.D. Keeps a Surprisingy Low Profile. AM. MED. NEWS 21, Sept. 7, 1990, avail-
able in 1990 WL 3259937.
" Our guest scholar who contributed this physics entry is Paul Horowitz, professor of physics at Har-
vard University. Professor Horowitz was a co-author of another scholarly legal essay. See Horowitz et al..
supra note 36, at 186-90.
" A. Einstein, On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies, 17 ANNALEN DER PHYSIK, 17, 891-921
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Schroedinger,4"3 and Heisenberg.4"4 Although few understood his Delphic
pronouncements at the time, the great Yogi Berra demonstrated his deep
knowledge and appreciation of modem physics and quantum theory, always
with characteristic humility and subtlety.
Berraism: "When you come to the fork in the road, take it."
415
Quantum Mechanical Application:
Intuition teaches us that an object, faced with a pair of alternative paths,
must choose one or the other. To the delight of generations of physicists,
Nature does it differently: an object traverses both paths, a phenomenon
known as quantum mechanical interference. In an often-quoted statement,
Professor Richard Feynman said the interference of massive particles "has in
it the heart of quantum mechanics." "In reality," he added, "it contains the
only mystery., 48
6
Quantum Mechanical Significance:
Only in the last decade has there been direct experimental proof that an
atom, faced with a pair of holes in a wall, goes through both.487 When faced
with a fork in the road, it takes it.
Berraisms:
(a) (When asked what time it was) "Do you mean now?"4"
(1905). Not much of a title for a paper that shook physics to its foundations and changed forever how we
view the universe. A translation is available in ARTHUR 1. MILLER. ALBERT EINSTEIN'S SPECIAL THEORY OF
RELATIVITY (1981). Better yet, one stands a chance of actually understanding it in a modem text such as
EDWIN F. TAYLOR & JOHN A. WHEELER, SPACETIME PHYSICS (1992).
4. E. Schroedinger, Quantisierung ais Eigenwertproblem, 79 ANNALEN DER PHYSIK, 361-76 (1926).
4 W. Heisenberg, Uber quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer
Beziehungen, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHYSIK, 879-93 (1925). Physics in those days was a German monopoly.
4 BASEBALL QUOTATIONS. supra note 6, at 150; BERRA, supra note 18, at 7.
4 RICHARD P. FEYNMAN Er AL., THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS vol. 3 at I-I (1965).
0" . Carnal & J. Mlynek, 66 PHYS. REV. LET. 2689 (1991). The atom here was metastable helium,
which was forced to encounter a pair of two-micrometer holes spaced eight micrometers apart. The action
was observed from a vantage point two feet downstream.
'" BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 152; BERRA, supra note 18, at 9; PEPE, supra note 8. at
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(b) (When asked about the shadows in left field at Yankee Stadium in
the fall) "It gets late early out there."'"
(c) (When asked about his variety of sweaters in assorted colors) "The
only color I don't have is navy brown.""
Application to the Theory of Relativity:
In his famous paper on relativity,49' Einstein turned intuition on its head
by showing that the concept of absolute time is a fiction. A first event that
precedes a second one, for one observer, may in fact follow it when viewed
by a different observer who is in motion. Yogi, keenly aware of this "relativi-
ty of simultaneity," put it succinctly in (a), above.
Einstein showed that the relativity of simultaneity implies that clocks in a
moving frame of reference run slow compared with clocks in a stationary
frame of reference. 2 Physicists call this time dilation and demonstrate, with
considerable glee, how it can prolong life in a bizarre effect known as the
"twin paradox," wherein a long-traveling twin returns home to find his broth-
er considerably older than himself. 3 Yogi knew all about this, and applied
it to Yankee stadium in (b), above.
Continuing the theme of the physics of moving objects, the well-known
Doppler effect (whereby the observed pitch of a train whistle changes as it
passes by) was refined by Einstein's theory to the compact form f= f (1 $0)
Thefs refer to frequency, which for light is the same thing as color.
187.
4 " BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; BERRA, supra note 18, at II; DICKSON, supra note
10, at 43; LEDERER, supra note 18, at 134: PEPE, supra note 8, at 187.
4", PEPE, supra note 8. at 186: LEDERER. supra note 18, at 134.
4' Einstein. supra note 482. The year 1905 was a banner year for the young patent examiner, who
also published an astonishing paper on the photoelectric effect (which showed that light behaves like parti-
cles), and another on the so-called "Brownian Motion." The Nobel committee awarded Einstein its prize for
1921, but not for relativity-they weren't sure of the long-term significance of this radical physics. Instead,
they played it safe, giving him the award for his explanation of the photoelectric effect.
4 , Id.
' See TAYLOR & WHEELER, supra note 482, at 125ff. This predicted refrigeration of one's aging ten-
dencies has been tested experimentally; see, e.g., J.C. Hafele & R.E. Keating, SCIENCE 177, 166-70 (1972),
for details of a flamboyant around-the-world plane trip with precise atomic clocks as passengers.
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Einstein's formula thus teaches us that navy blue, when seen running fast
enough, becomes navy brown. Yogi, with characteristic modesty, skipped the
fancy formulae, cutting to the quick in (c), above.
CONCLUSION
This Essay is over.94
" As Yogi said, "It's not over 'til it's over." BASEBALL QUOTATIONS, supra note 6, at 150; BERRA,
supra note 18, at 5; DICKSON. supra note 10, at 43; PEPE, supra note 8, at 185.
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